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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
THREE ESSAYS ON SELF-EMPLOYMENT TRANSITIONS, ORGANIZATIONAL 
CAPITAL, AND FIRM FORMATION
by
Fatma Deli
Florida International University, 2011
Miami, Florida
Professor Peter Thompson, Major Professor
      This dissertation explores how economic, organizational, and personal factors affect 
self-employment  transitions,  occupational  decisions,  and  firm  formation  activities  of 
individuals  at  different  positions  in  the  skill  distribution.  The  first  essay  of  my 
dissertation studies how local unemployment rates differentially affect entry into self-
employment by individuals  at  different  places  in  the skill  distribution.  The empirical 
results show a positive correlation between local unemployment rates and entry into self-
employment for low-ability workers, but not for high-ability workers. Including employer 
size  to  eliminate  possible  distortions  showed  that  the  positive  association  between 
unemployment and self-employment among low-ability workers is in fact driven by the 
small  firm  effect.  Controlling  for  firm  size  yields  a  negative  association  between 
unemployment and self-employment among high-ability workers. 
vi
        Effects of organizational capital, human capital and physical capital, on the firm 
formation activities of people at distinct skill levels depend on the type of the industry 
which is chosen for the new firm. Two types of industries, capital-intensive and ability-
intensive, are utilized to explore this hypothesis in the second essay. A capital-intensive 
industry requires more physical investment, and consequently more funds, whereas, an 
ability-intensive  industry  requires  more  human  capital.  It  is  shown  that  high  human 
capital requirements are associated with higher earnings among the most able individuals, 
and therefore makes them more likely to found firms in an ability-intensive industry. 
Wealthy people are more likely to establish both capital-intensive and ability-intensive 
firms,  even  though  the  amount  of  funds  necessary  for  two  industry  types  differs. 
Moreover, entry into both industries is predicted to happen later in life due to the removal 
of entry barriers constituted by required investment spending using savings when old. 
Empirical mixed results are observed.
         The third essay investigates earning differentials between future entrepreneurs and 
their  non-entrepreneurial  colleagues.  Results  show that high-ability firm-owners in  an 
ability-intensive  industry were  earning more  than  those that  remained in  wage-work, 
whereas, low-ability firm-owners  in a capital-intensive industry were earning less than 
those remaining in paid-work. 
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I. INTRODUCTION
          Since the creation of new firms is an important driver of new product and job  
creation,   entrepreneurship plays a crucial role in economic growth. The important role 
of  self-employment  has  stimulated  the  interest  of  researchers  in  understanding  its 
determinants.  Much  of  the  literature  is  focused  on  the  importance  of  personal 
characteristics in the prediction of self-employment. However, there are still unanswered 
questions  about  the  roles  of  existing  economic  conditions  and their  interactions  with 
personal  characteristics  in  transitions  into  self-employment.  The  three  essays  in  this 
dissertation  focus  on  how economic,  organizational,  and personal  factors  affect  self-
employment  transitions,  occupational  decisions,  and  firm  formation  activities  of 
individuals at different positions in the skill distribution. 
        Data taken from Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) are used for empirical  
analysis in my research. The PSID is a longitudinal study of U.S individuals and family 
units. Because of PSID's longitudinal nature, I can observe personal economic activities 
in each year and therefore I can detect any changes in personal data. The longitudinal 
nature of the data set allows me to identify the timing of transitions from paid-work to 
self-employment for  each person.  Additionally,  the  PSID has  data  regarding personal 
characteristics  including age,  gender,  education,  work experience,  occupation,  wealth, 
prior employment, region, and annual labor income that are also crucial for my research. 
As  indicated  in  the  literature,  individuals  at  the  lower  and  upper  ends  of  the  skill 
distribution  are  more  likely  to  be  self-employed  [Elfenbeim,  Hamilton,  and  Zenger, 
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(2008)]. That is, these low and high ability people are the ones who found new firms. 
Therefore, workers are classified in my samples according to their ability levels, which is 
assessed in the following way: I use econometrically unexplained income as a proxy for 
ability, and to measure this, I use personal data to control for characteristics affecting 
labor income in the wage regressions.
          The  first  essay of  my dissertation  studies  how local  unemployment  rates  
differentially affect entry into self-employment by individuals at different places in the 
skill distribution. The study uses two samples, for the periods 1978-1983 and 1993-1995, 
from  the  PSID  and  exploits  state  and  temporal  variations  in  unemployment  rates. 
Consistent with the literature on push-entrepreneurship and opportunity entrepreneurship, 
I  expected  to  find  a  positive  correlation  between  local  unemployment  rates  and  the 
probability of becoming self-employed for people at the low end, and a negative effect at 
the high end of the skill distribution. The results show a positive correlation between 
local unemployment rates and entry into self-employment for low-ability workers, but not 
for high-ability workers. Given relationships that have recently been reported between 
ability, firm size and employment choice, it is possible that results are distorted by the 
omission of controls for firm size. Controls for employer size are available for one of the 
two  samples.  Including  them  indicates  that  the  positive  association  between 
unemployment and self-employment among low-ability workers is in fact driven by the 
effect of employer size. Controlling for firm size  yields a negative association between 
unemployment and self-employment among high-ability workers. 
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      My second essay explores  the  role  of  organizational  capital  in  firm formation 
activities  of  individuals  at  different  skill  levels  over  time.  Transitions  into 
entrepreneurship are also influenced by the type of industry which will be chosen for the 
new firm. Whether the industry requires more capital  or more ability is an important 
criteria for a potential entrepreneur to consider while founding a new firm. A capital-
intensive industry refers to an industry requiring substantial investment in capital assets, 
and  consequently  requiring  more  liquidity  for  entry.  An  ability-intensive  industry, 
however,  is  an industry requiring  more  human capital  instead  of  physical  capital  for 
production.  My research   investigates  how organizational  capital,  human  capital  and 
physical  capital,  constitute  barriers  to  firm formation  by individuals  at  different  skill 
levels over time. 
     Since  people  have  different  skill  levels  and different  amounts  of  initial  wealth, 
required organizational capital for the new firm may constitute an effective entry barrier. 
Not having enough money constitutes an entry barrier for a capital intensive-industry, 
while  not  having  enough  skill   constitutes  an  entry  barrier  for  an  ability-intensive 
industry.  My study includes  a  model  simulating  interactions  among  a  representative 
utility  maximizing  agent  and  his/her  profit  maximizing  firm.  I  also  analyze  testable 
implications of my model empirically by using a sample, for the period 2003-2007, from 
the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. 
         My model illustrates the followings: Both industry types, capital-intensive and 
ability-intensive,  require  funds  for  investment  spending  in  the  model.  However,  the 
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amount necessary for a capital-based firm is greater than amount necessary for an ability-
based firm. Moreover, high human capital is also necessary for an ability-based firm. 
Thus, a required high skill level induces the most able individuals to found firms in an 
ability-intensive industry.  Firm formation by individuals in distinct places of the skill 
distribution depend on their initial wealth and saving behavior. That is, if they have high 
initial wealth, and if the monetary return from a capital-intensive industry is greater than 
the return from an ability-intensive industry and paid-work, then they prefer to found a 
firm in a capital-intensive industry when young. Another option of self-employment for 
young individuals who do not have high initial wealth is to form a firm in an ability-
intensive  industry  if  their  skill  levels  allow.  If  the  monetary  return  from an  ability-
intensive industry is greater than the return from a capital-intensive industry and paid-
work, then they found a new venture in an ability-intensive industry in the first period of 
their life even though their initial wealth is limited. Otherwise, they stay at their current 
jobs and save to accumulate the required funds for investment in a capital-intensive or an 
ability-intensive industry. These latter individuals establish their own firm in the second 
period of their life by using their savings. 
        Mixed empirical results about the predictions of the model are observed. That is, 
more personal ability makes high-ability individuals more likely to establish ability-based 
firms. In contrast, low-ability individuals are more likely to work as wage-earners than to 
found their own firms when personal ability level increases. It is empirically shown that 
higher wealth makes people more likely to found both capital-based and ability-based 
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firms. The regression estimates indicate that entry into an ability-intensive industry often 
happen later in life for lower-skilled people. Entries into a capital-intensive industry also 
happens later in life for low-ability individuals but not for high-ability ones. 
      My  third  essay  empirically  analyzes  earning  differentials  between  future 
entrepreneurs  and  their  non-entrepreneurial  colleagues  by  considering  the  industries 
chosen by entrepreneurs. Two types of industries, ability-intensive and capital-intensive, 
are defined for the analysis.  A sample from the PSID covering the period 2003-2007 is 
utilized to test my hypotheses. The empirical results are consistent with my hypotheses. 
That is, individuals who form firms in an ability-intensive industry were earning more 
than  others  remaining  in  wage-work.  Since  an  ability-intensive  industry  requires  a 
relatively high skill level, they are more likely to have higher ability. On the other hand, 
people  who  found  firms  in  a  capital-intensive  industry  were  earning  less  than  other 
employees  remaining  on  the  job.  They  are  more  likely  to  be  lower-ability  workers 
because capital-intensive industry requires more liquidity and less ability.
      This  dissertation  is  organized  as  follows:  Section  2  presents  the  first  essay 
Opportunity and Necessity Entrepreneurship: Local Unemployment and the Small Firm 
Effect, section 3 contains the second essay Organizational Capital and Barriers to Firm 
Formation,  and  the  last  section  shows  the  third  essay  Who  earns  more?  Future 
Entrepreneurs or Their Non-Entrepreneurial Colleagues.
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II. CHAPTER 1 : OPPORTUNITY AND NECESSITY ENTREPRENEURSHIP:
                               LOCAL UNEMPLOYMENT AND THE SMALL FIRM EFFECT
Introduction
      Since entry into self-employment has an important place in the creation of many new 
firms, products, and services, it affects nearly all markets of the economy. The crucial 
role  of  entrepreneurship  leads  researchers  to  focus  on  the  determinants  of  self-
employment.  Creation  of  new  organizations  by  entrepreneurs  depends  on  several 
parameters including personal characteristics, or existing conditions.
        Much of the research has focused on the roles of individual characteristics like age,  
education, and gender in the probability of entry into self-employment. These individual 
characteristics  affect not only the likelihood of becoming self-employed, but also affect 
personal  income  which,  in  turn,  is  also  related  to  the  likelihood  of  becoming  self-
employed.  The  literature  shows  that  incomes  of  wage-earners  and  self-employed 
individuals are not the same [Hamilton (2000)]. Hamilton (2000) finds that the median of 
three  distinct  measures  of  self-employment  earnings  reported  in  the  1984  Survey of 
Income and Program Participation (SIPP) were lower than wages, while their variance 
was greater. 1
1    Gort and Lee (2007), found that average earnings of self-employed respondents in the NSF Scientist 
and Engineers Statistical Data System (SESTAT), were higher than those of wage-earners. However, the 
SESTAT sample is biased towards high earners, where self-employed incomes are higher. On the other 
hand, they find that incomes of wage-earners are higher than those of self-employed individuals at the 
lower end of the distribution.
6
       The standard explanation for this result is that self-employment earnings and wages 
respond differently to variations in ability.  Constructed models of employment choice 
show that return to ability is convex among the self-employed and linear among wage 
earners [Braguinsky and Ohyama (2008);  Astebro, Chen and Thompson (2009)]. This 
induces individuals in the tails of the ability distribution to choose self-employment over 
wage work. Their models are consistent at the upper end of the earning distribution with 
the economics of superstars (Rosen, 1981), and at the lower end with Min’s (1984) claim 
that lower end of the earnings distribution is populated by “misfits” who cannot work 
well with others.  
        Variations in returns to ability can explain the static distributions of self-employment 
earnings and wages, but they do not offer a clear explanation of how people  enter into 
self-employment. Instead, transitions have been explained in the contexts of opportunity 
and  necessity  entrepreneurship.  Block  and  Wagner  (2006)  define  opportunity 
entrepreneurs as individuals who start a business in order to pursue an opportunity, and 
necessity entrepreneurs as individuals who are driven into self-employment because of 
limited  opportunity  in  the  wage  sector.  Because  the  former  are  attracted  into  self-
employment by the identification of opportunities, they are more likely to establish new 
firms when economic conditions are good. In contrast, necessity entrepreneurs are often 
driven into self-employment after becoming involuntarily unemployed, so they are likely 
to be more common in periods of rising and high unemployment.
       The present section links these two disparate lines of inquiry – variations in ability 
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and the distinction between necessity and opportunity entrepreneurs – by analyzing the 
effect  of  variations  in  the  local  unemployment  rate  on  the  propensity  to  enter  self-
employment for individuals of differing ability. Opportunity entrepreneurs tend to have 
high levels of creativity and personal ability and, as a result tend to be located in the 
upper end of the earnings distribution, both before and after entering self-employment. As 
a result, I expect that high-ability individuals are more likely to enter self-employment 
when local unemployment rates are low. Necessity entrepreneurs, on the other hand, see 
no better alternative for earning money than becoming self-employed. These people are 
not generally creative and are often low-ability employees. Consequently, we expect that 
high local unemployment rates stimulate entry into self-employment among individuals 
with low ability.
     These hypotheses are tested using observations on a large sample of individuals in the 
PSID, matched in each year to the unemployment rate prevailing in the state of residence. 
Two panels are constructed, for the periods 1978-1983 and 1993-1995; the latter, shorter, 
panel  is  included  because  I  will  need  to  control  for  employer  size  in  a  number  of 
regressions that follow.
        Since the likelihood of opportunity and necessity entrepreneurship  is related to 
personal ability, I construct an indicator for innate ability from the residuals obtained in a 
regression of earnings on   age, gender, education, work experience, industry, occupation, 
and state of residence (cf. Behrman and Rosenzweig, 1999). Individuals are placed in five 
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ability groups, denoted by A1 through A5, with A1 representing the lowest ability group. 
These  are  not  quintiles.  Groups  A1,  A2,  and A3 each account  for  25 percent  of  the 
observations, A4 accounts for the next fifteen percent, and A5 represents the highest ten 
percent.
      The main analysis consists of logistic regressions examining how the probability of 
transitioning  from  wage  employment  into  self-employment  is  affected  by  the  local 
unemployment  rate,  estimated  ability,  and  interactions  between  ability  and  local 
unemployment. My hypothesis is that the coefficient(s) on the interaction between ability 
and unemployment will be positive among the low ability group(s), and negative for the 
high  ability group(s).  The key results  are  as  follows.  For  the  1978-1983 sample,  the 
probability  of  becoming  self-employed  is  on  average  increasing  in  the  local 
unemployment rate. However, when effects are allowed to vary by ability group,  local 
unemployment stimulates entry into self-employment for groups A1 through A4, but not 
for the most able individuals, in group A5. These results are robust to the inclusion of 
controls  for  age,  gender,  education,  and  work  experience.  Qualitatively  similar,  but 
statistically  insignificant  results,  are  obtained  for  the  1993-1995  sample;  the  lack  of 
statistical significance may be the result of the modest sample size  resulting from only 
having two years of transitions. Because of the reduced sample size, I reduce demands on 
the data by merging groups A1 through A4 on the basis of personal skill level. While the 
point estimates continue to indicate that local unemployment stimulates entry into self-
employment for the low-ability group but not for high-ability group, these results remain 
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statistically insignificant. 
         The results that have been obtained may be the result of failure to controls for firm 
size.  Employees of small  firms are far more likely to become self-employed than are 
employees  of  larger  firms  (Elfenbeim,  Hamilton,  and  Zenger,  2008).  Employment  in 
small  firms is  more volatile  and susceptible to  negative economic shocks (Davis and 
Haltiwanger,  1992;  Davis  et  al.,  1996;  Rob,  1995),  and  that  residual  earnings  are 
increasing when employer size increases (Abowd et al., 1999; Brown and Medoff, 1989; 
Acs, 1999). Thus, the way that ability appears to mediate the effect of unemployment on 
entry into self-employment may be the result of employer size rather than ability.
       Only the latter of the two PSID samples contains information about employer size.  
Therefore, the 1993-1995 sample is used to test the role of employer size on the previous 
results. I first evaluate the effect of firm size without considering unemployment levels. 
Consistent with the literature, I find that prior employment in a small firm dramatically 
enhances  the  probability  of  entering  into  self-employment.  However,  interacting  an 
indicator  for  small  firm  size  with  ability,  I  find  that  employment  in  a  small  firm 
stimulates self-employment only for individuals in groups A1 and A2 (i.e., those with 
ability below the 50th percentile). 
       The results do not indicate any relationship between the probability of becoming self-
employed  and  employment  in  a  small  firm  for  high-ability  individuals.  The  result 
contrasts  with the findings of Elfenbeim, Hamilton,  and Zenger (2008),  who found a 
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sizeable small-firm effect at the upper end of  the ability distribution. Finally, I control 
jointly  for  a  small  firm  effect  and  the  local  unemployment  rate  in  regressions  run 
separately by ability group. 
       Despite the modest sample sizes, the results are surprisingly sharp. For ability groups 
A1  and  A2,  employment  in  small  firms  raises  the  probability  of  entry  into  self-
employment while variations in the local unemployment rate have no effect. In contrast, 
there is no small firm effect among ability groups A3 through A5, but increases in the 
local unemployment rate reduce the likelihood of entry into self-employment. As a result, 
I find no robust evidence that necessity entrepreneurship is stimulated by increases in 
local unemployment rates, but I do find evidence that opportunity entrepreneurship is 
stifled by high unemployment. 
       This section is organized as follows: The second part describes data and methods 
used, the third part presents results, and the last part concludes.
Data and Methods
        I use two panels of data constructed from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics 
(PSID)  and  local  unemployment  rates  at  the  state  level2.  My  data  contain  32,335 
individuals in years 1978-1983 and 1993-1995. I add state unemployment rates to the 
data. These two time periods are chosen because they have all information that I need for 
2 Source: U.S Bureau of Labor Statistics
11
this study. The 1978-1983 sample is chosen first to study the local unemployment effect. 
The 1993-1995 sample is added to the study because of the lack of firm size data in the 
first  sample.  Even though the  1993-1995 sample  is  small  relative  to  the  first  one,  it 
enables me to control for both local unemployment and small firm effects simultaneously. 
I use household heads in both samples because they are family members about whom the 
greatest amount of information is available. 
                    Table 1: Summary statistics of annual total labor income for 
                                wage-earners and self-employed people for both samples.
1978-1983 1993-1995
Wage-
Earners 
Self-
Employed 
Wage-
Earners 
Self-
Employed
Mean 15,770 19,334 22,543 37,435
Std. Dev.  10,452 20,304 24,067 58,748
25th 
Percentile  7,140  6,419 10,568  9,891
50th 
Percentile  13,713  13,160 25,858 29,288
75th 
Percentile  17,660  18,040  33,015 40,533
90th 
Percentile  21,747  24,751 40,147  51,425
100th 
Percentile  32,552  42,946 55,316  66,559
Observations 22,752 3,220 5,471 664
               
        Since my purpose in this chapter is to estimate the impacts of some existing personal 
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characteristics and conditions on the probability of becoming self-employed, there are 
both  wage-earners  and  self-employed  individuals  in  my  samples.  Incomes  of  wage-
earners and self-employed people are not the same. Summary statistics of annual total 
labor income for wage-earners and self-employed individuals for different years are given 
in Table 1. The distributions of annual labor incomes of household heads for both wage-
earners and self-employed can be seen in Figure-1 and Figure-2 for two samples.
              
         
      Figure-1:  Distributions of income for wage-earners and self-employed; 1978-1983.
 
       Figures 1, 2, and Table 1 show that mean incomes of self-employed people are  
greater  than  those  of  wage-earners  for  both  samples.  The  same  is  also  true  for  the 
variances. That is, the variances of incomes for self-employed individuals are larger than 
those for wage-earners.
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       Figure-2:  Distributions of income for wage-earners and self-employed; 1993-1995.
Incomes of self-employed individuals are lower than those of wage-earners at the 25 th 
percentile  and  higher  at  the  90th percentile  for  the  period  of  1978-1983.  Similarly, 
incomes of self-employed individuals are lower than those of wage-earners at the 25 th 
percentile and higher at the 75th percentile for the period of 1993-1995.
       The total labor income of an individual depends on individual characteristics like 
age,  gender,  education,  work experience,  industry,  occupation,  state  of residence,  and 
personal  ability.  We  can  measure  age,  gender,  education,  work  experience,  industry, 
occupation, and state of residence but we cannot measure personal ability directly. There 
are two way to measure ability used in literature. The first, which is used by Elfenbeim, 
Hamilton,  and  Zenger  (2008)  holds  the  education  level  constant.  They  construct  a 
14
percentile rank in the skill  distribution separately for people having the same highest 
degree. They measure relative ability as the position of a given individual within the pay 
distribution in a given year among individuals with the same highest degree. The method 
used by Elfenbeim, Hamilton, and Zenger (2008) seems logical because we observe large 
income differences among people having identical observable human capital. However, 
this method ignores the impacts of work experience, age, gender, and state of residence 
on  personal  labor  income.  These  additional  characteristics  can  also  create  large 
differences in labor income. The one with more work experience can earn more than 
others although all have identical highest degrees. Similarly, earnings of a person can be 
different in two different cities even for people with same job. 
       The second way of measuring personal ability is to use residual income as a proxy. 
Juhn,  Murphy,  and  Pierce  (1993) use  this  method  to  determine  ability  levels  of 
individuals and therefore their relative  positions in the skill distribution. This is a more 
logical way of measuring ability level than the one used by Elfenbeim, Hamilton, and 
Zenger (2008). It controls for the effects of age, gender, and education level on personal 
labor income and uses the residual as a measure of ability. As Behrman and Rosenzweig 
(1999)  indicate,  ability  has  been  used  as  the  rubric  for  all  unmeasured  earnings 
endowments, which may include genetic endowments of ability, preschool human capital, 
or motivation. 
         I also use residual income in this study as a proxy to determine the position of an 
individual in the skill distribution. Unexplained incomes used in this chapter are residuals 
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from a regression of the logarithm of income on some observable individual variables. 
These variables are occupation, industry, state of residence, age, gender, education level, 
and work experience.  A general form of the wage regression is given below.
                Ln(income)i,t  = α0 + α1 Xi  + α2 Yi,t  + εi,t                                                                             (1)
where the vector Xi  represents a set of time-invariant individual characteristics, and the 
vector Yi,t represents a set of time-varying individual characteristics of person-i in year-t. 
As indicated  by Garen (1984)  and Weiss  (1995),  a  regression  of  wage on education 
results  in  biased  coefficient  estimates.  Thus,  I  used  Heckman  two-step  correction  to 
obtain unbiased parameters. Marital status and the number of children at home are used 
in  the selection  equation  in  addition to  the other  variables.  The first  stage  estimates, 
presented in Part-B of Table 2, show that being married and having more education are 
positively correlated and that more educated people have fewer children.
      Table 2 also presents estimates of the wage regressions for both samples, which 
includes 8 occupation, 10 industry, and 51 state of residence dummy variables in addition 
to  age,  gender,  education,  and  work  experience  explanatory  variables  in  the  wage 
regressions. The results indicate that education raises earnings3, work experience induces 
higher  incomes,  and   males  earn  more  than  females.  These  are  all  familiar  and 
unsurprising results. The lambda terms are negative and statistically significant. 
3 This  positive correction between education and earning is also shown by Becker and Chiswick (1966), 
Willis and Rosen (1979), Taubman and Wales (1974), and Jovanovic and Moffitt (1990).
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                                 Table 2 : Labor Income Regressions for Both Samples
1978-1983 1993-1995
Constant 7.9309(0.1290)
7.5821
(0.7840)
Age 0.0018**(0.0015)
0.0049**
(0.0023)
Gender 0.5683***(0.0123)
0.5749***
(0.0360)
Education 0.0580***(0.0016)
0.0614***
(0.0071)
Work Experience 0.0107***(0.0007)
0.0089***
(0.0031)
Lambda - 0.3412***(0.0261)
- 0.2013***
(0.0124)
R2 0.3450 0.2408
First Stage Estimates
Constant    0.2409**
(0.0431)
   0.1413**
(0.0431)
Age 0.1703
(0.3100)
0.1529
(0.2123)
Gender     0.5380**
(0.2079)
    0.6401**
(0.3085)
Married   0.1923*
(0.0192)
  0.1804*
(0.0681)
Number of Children - 0.4083**
(0.0240)
- 0.3110**
(0.0360)
Work Experience - 0.1105
(0.2010)
- 0.2015
(0.3124)
R2 0.2941 0.2403
Observations 26,200 6,135
                    Standard Errors are reported in parentheses. Regressions include 8 occupation, 
                    10 industry, and 51 state of residence dummies.
                    ***Significant at 1 %  level; **Significant at 5 %  level;  *Significant at 10 %  level    
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      That  is,  the  error  terms  in  the  selection  and primary equations  are  negatively 
correlated for both samples. Thus, unobserved factors that make participation more likely 
tend to be associated with lower wages.
Table 3: Summary statistics of unexplained incomes
1978-1983 1993-1995
Wage-Earners Self-Employed Wage-Earners Self-Employed 
Mean 0.015 - 0.121 0.0031 - 0.021
Std. Dev. 0.598 0.852 0.890 1.217
25th Percentile -0.812 -0.853 -1.229 -1.202
50th Percentile -0.062 -0.068 -0.034 -0.045
75th Percentile 0.204 0.259 0.430 0.326
90th Percentile 0.515 0.604 0.651 0.593
100th Percentile 0.876 1.037 1.287 1.449
Observations 22,752 3,220 4,312 603
       Summary  statistics  of  residual  income  for  wage-earners  and  self-employed 
individuals for different years are given in Table 3. The table 3 along with Figures 3 and 
4,  show that  mean residual  income for  self-employed people is  smaller  than that  for 
wage-earners. However, the variance of unexplained income for self-employed people is 
larger.  Unexplained income of  self-employed individuals  is  lower than that  of  wage-
earners at the 25th percentile and higher above the 90th percentile for both periods 1978-
1983 and 1993-1995. 
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                Figure-3: Distributions of unexplained income for wage-earners and 
                               self-employed; 1978-1983
 
                  Figure-4:  Distributions of unexplained income for wage-earners and 
                                 self-employed; 1993-1995 
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          As mentioned in the introduction, I use five ability groups to classify individuals in 
my samples according to their positions in the skill distribution.  People below the first 
25th percentile of the skill distribution are in A1. Since they are at the lowest end, they are 
called low-ability people in this chapter. People at the high end of the skill distribution 
are classified as high-ability people. They constitute the top 10 % of the skill distribution. 
People in between these two ends are divided into three additional groups as A2, A3, and 
A4. Groups A2 and A3 contain the second and the third quantiles of the skill distribution, 
respectively. People in A4 constitute the fifteen percent of the skill distribution above 
those in A3. 
Table-4: Summary statistics of Annual Total Labor Income for Small Firm 
                                      Employees and Self-Employed Individuals 
1993-1995
Small Firm 
Employees
Large Firm 
Employees
Self-Employed 
Mean 24,456 31,795 37,435
Std. Dev.  17,936 33,818 58,748
25th Percentile  11,264 10,186  9,891
50th Percentile  21,950 27,501 29,288
75th Percentile 29,779 34,681 40,533
90th Percentile 35,280  43,259  51,425
100th Percentile 40,378 66,522  66,559
Observations 1,127 3,735 664
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       Since  this  chapter  analysis  the  effect  of  the  local  unemployment  rate  on  the 
likelihood of entrepreneurship, unemployment rates of U.S states are added to the data 
sets.  The local  unemployment  effect  is  tested  for  the  two samples  with  and without 
considering ability levels of individuals. The results of these tests are presented in the 
following section. In order to check the robustness of these results, I further control for 
firm size. The PSID contains information about the number of employees in last firm an 
individual worked in. I define a small firm as the one with  fewer than 25 employees. The 
only constraint is that information about the size of the previous employer is available 
only for the  1993-1995 period. Thus, only the 1993-1995 data is used to control for firm 
size. 
Figure-5:  Distributions of annual total labor income for small firms employees and 
                      self-employed individuals
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         Total labor incomes of small firm employees and self-employed people are not the 
same. Figure-5 plots their distributions. Summary statistics of annual total labor incomes 
for small-firm employees, large firm employees, and self-employed individuals are given 
in Table 4. Figure 5 and Table 4 indicate that mean income of small-firm employees is 
less than that of self-employed people, while the  variance of incomes for self-employed 
individuals  is  larger  than  that  for  small-firm  employees.  Incomes  of  self-employed 
individuals are lower than those of wage-earners only at the 25th percentile. When we 
compare  incomes  of  three  groups  presented  in  Table  4,  we  observe  that  large  firm 
employees  earner  more than small  firm employees,  whereas they earn less than self-
employed individuals. Incomes of small firm employees are greater than those of large 
firm workers only at the 25th percentile. 
      I  use  year-pairs  in  my logistic  regressions  because  my aim is  to  estimate  the  
probability  of  entry  into  self-employment  from  paid-work  in  the  second  year  by 
considering individual characteristics and conditions given in the first year. Three main 
forms of my logistic regressions are given in equations (2), (3), and (4). The dependent 
variable in each specification is equal to one if person-i is self-employed in the current 
year  and  zero  otherwise  given  that  he/she  was  a  wage-earner  in  the  previous  year. 
Analogous to specification (1),  Xi   and   Yi,t are two vectors used to test the impacts of 
individual  characteristics  on  the  likelihood  of  entry  into  self-employment  in  all 
regressions.  While  the  vector  Xi   represents  a  set  of  time-invariant  individual 
characteristics, the vector Yi,t  represents a set of time-variant  individual characteristics of 
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person-i in year-t.
               PR(SELi,t +1  = 1 | SELi,t  = 0) = β0 + β1 Xi  + β2 Yi,t  + β3 LUi,t  + εi,t +1                                    (2)
where  LUi,t.  is a vector consisting of the unemployment rate in year-t of the state of 
residence of individual-i, and interactions4 of the unemployment rate with ability. The 
effect of firm size is tested with the specification 
                  PR(SELi,t +1  = 1 | SELi,t  = 0) = θ0 + θ1 Xi  + θ2 Yi,t  + θ3 SFi,t  + εi,t +1                                   (3) 
where SFi,t  is a vector consisting of a dummy equal to one if the employer in period-t had 
lower than 25 employees, and again an interaction with ability. Finally, I simultaneously 
control for unemployment and firm size with the following specification.
 
               PR(SELi,t +1  = 1 | SELi,t  = 0) = γ0 + γ1 Xi + γ2Yi,t  + γ3Li,t  + γ4Si,t  + εi,t +1                          (4) 
The variables Li,t  and  Si,t   represent U.S local unemployment rates and prior employer's 
size. This regression is run for each ability group separately, so there are no interaction 
terms. 
4    Interaction terms are used in the regressions as described in Chunrong and Norton (2003).
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Results
        The tables in this section exhibit results  for the critical explanatory variables. 
Estimates  for  occupation,  industry,  and  state  of  residence  variables  are  not  reported 
because they are not the main concern of this chapter. Estimated marginal effects for the 
first two logistic regressions are given in Table 5 for 1978-1983, and in Table 6 for 1993-
1995.
      Table  5  provides  logistic  regression  results  for  the  period  1978-1983.  Both 
regressions  include  age,  gender,  education,  and  work  experience  as  independent 
variables. Results are very similar for these variables in both models. Age and education 
are  positively  correlated  with  probability  of  becoming  self-employed,  while  men  are 
more likely to become self-employed than women. There is also a positive correlation 
between  work  experience  and  the  probability  of  entering  self-employment,   but  this 
correlation is statistically insignificant.
          The table also provides evidence about the effect of local unemployment rates on 
the likelihood of entrepreneurship. Column (1) indicates that local unemployment rates 
and the probability of entry into self-employment are positively correlated. Moreover, a 
high local unemployment rate is a strong significant predictor of entrepreneurship. 
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Table 5 : Probability of Becoming Self-Employed, 1978-1983; (Marginal Effects)
Dependent variable = 1 if self-employed in current year,  0  otherwise.
(1) (2)
Age     0.0005**
(0.0002)
0.0003*
(0.0002)
Gender       0.0302***
(0.0037)
      0.0297***
(0.0034)
Education     0.0010**
(0.0004)
      0.0011***
(0.0004)
Work Experience 0.0001
(0.0002)
0.0001 
(0.0002)
Local Unemployment Rates       0.0031***
(0.0008)
- 0.0001
(0.0013)
A1 ----      0.0459***(0.0110)
A2 ---- 0.0091(0.0119)
A3 ---- - 0.0084(0.0122)
A4 ---- Dropped
A5 ----      0.0586***(0.0127)
Local Unemployment Rates-A1 ---- 0.0025*(0.0013)
Local Unemployment Rates-A2 ----      0.0041***(0.0014)
Local Unemployment Rates-A3 ----      0.0052***(0.0015)
Local Unemployment Rates- A4 ----       0.0049***(0.0016)
Local Unemployment Rates-A5 ---- Dropped
Pseudo R2 0.0838 0.1070
Observations 22,848 22,848
       Standard Errors are reported in parentheses. 
         ***Significant at 1 %  level; **Significant at 5 %  level; *Significant at 10 %  level    
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         Column (2) displays results from a deeper examination of the local unemployment  
effect  after  considering five ability groups.  Consistent  with earlier  literature,  I  find a 
statistically significant  positive correlation between local unemployment rates and the 
probability  of  becoming  self-employed  for  people  at  the  lower  end  of  the  skill 
distribution. In fact, the correlation between local unemployment rates and the likelihood 
of  being  an  entrepreneur  is  positive  and statistically  significant  for  individuals  in  all 
ability  groups  except  A5.  In  other  words,  high  local  unemployment  rates  are  strong 
predictors of entry into entrepreneurship for all but the most able individuals.
         Consistent with the literature, I was expecting a negative correlation between local 
unemployment rates and the probability of entry into self-employment for workers at 
highest  end  of  the  skill  distribution.  Surprisingly,  the  estimates  reveal  no  correlation 
between them in A5. 
        Table  6  repeats  results  from the  second sample.  The effects  of  age,  gender, 
education, and work experience are similar to those found in the first sample.5 Column 
(1)  of  Table  6  shows  that  local  unemployment  rates  have  a  positive,  but  statically 
insignificant, influence on the transition of workers into self-employment.  Estimates for 
interaction  terms  between  local  unemployment  rates  and  the  five  ability  groups  are 
similar for the two samples, except for A4 and A5. 
5    Education and work experience are both positively correlated with the probability of self-employment. 
Estimates for them are statistically significant. Males are more likely to be self-employed than females but, 
the estimate is statistically insignificant. 
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Table 6 : Probability of Becoming Self-Employed, 1993-1995; (Marginal Effects)  
 Dependent variable = 1 if self-employed in current year,  0  otherwise.
(1) (2)
Age - 0.0005
(0.0004)
   - 0.0009***
(0.0003)
Gender 0.0071
(0.0064)
0.0063
(0.005)
Education      0.0040***
(0.0012)
    0.0028***
(0.0009)
Work Experience     0.0011**
(0.0005)
   0.0008**
(0.0003)
Local Unemployment Rates 0.0007
(0.0076)
- 0.0051
(0.0063)
A1 ---- Dropped
A2 ---- 0.0045(0.0341)
A3 ---- 0.0038(0.0292)
A4 ---- 0.0354(0.0299)
A5 ---- 0.0260(0.0279)
Local Unemployment Rates-A1 ---- 0.0050(0.0043)
Local Unemployment Rates-A2 ---- 0.0006(0.0053)
Local Unemployment Rates-A3 ---- 0.0031(0.0046)
Local Unemployment Rates-A4 ---- Dropped
Local Unemployment Rates-A5 ----
- 0.0005
(0.0044)
Pseudo R2 0.0804 0.0782
Observations 4,187 5,375
      Standard Errors are reported in parentheses. ***Significant at 1 %  level; **Significant at 5 %  level *Significant at 10 %  level 
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      That is,  lower-ability individuals in A1, A2, and A3 are more likely to be self-
employed when local unemployment rates are high. However, the point estimates ones 
for the second sample are statistically insignificant. There is no correlation between local 
unemployment  rates  and  the  probability  of  self-employment  for  individuals  in  A4, 
suggesting that this group is not affected by local unemployment in their entrepreneurial 
decisions.  Also contrary to the first sample, local unemployment rates and the probability 
of transition into self-employment are negatively correlated for people in A5, although 
these results are insignificant. 
         The insignificant results in the second sample may be the result of its smaller size. 
Because, the first sample has six years of data, while the second sample has only has only 
two years.  I reduce demands on data in the second sample by dividing individuals into 
just two ability groups: L. Group and  H. Group.  L. Group includes individuals having 
ability levels up to the 90th percentile of the skill distribution, while H. Group includes 
individuals in the top 10 percent. Table 7 reports outcomes of the same analysis done 
before by using these two new ability groups. Unfortunately, this combination of ability 
groups did not alter the results; There was no statistically significant result.
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       Table 7 : Probability of Becoming Self-Employed, 1993-1995 (Marginal Effects)
       
 Dependent variable = 1 if self-employed in current year,  0  otherwise. 
(1) (2)
Age - 0.0005
(0.0004)
   - 0.0009***
(0.0003)
Gender 0.0071
(0.0064)
0.0055
(0.0052)
Education       0.0040***
(0.0012)
     0.0030***
(0.0009)
Work Experience     0.0011**
(0.0005)
   0.0009**
(0.0003)
Local Unemployment Rates 0.0007
(0.0076)
- 0.0063
(0.0065)
L.Group (bottom 90%) ---- Dropped
H.Group (top 10%) ---- 0.0166(0.0244)
Local Unemployment Rates-L.Group ---- 0.0034(0.0034)
Local Unemployment Rates-H.Group ---- Dropped
Pseudo R2 0.0804 0.0657
Observations 4,187 5,375
      Standard Errors are reported in parentheses. 
      ***Significant at 1 %  level; **Significant at 5 %  level; *Significant at 10 %  level    
        The results suggest that local unemployment influences transitions of low-ability 
individuals  into  self-employment  but  has  no  impact  on  the  most  able  people.  These 
results  may  change  if  firm  size  is  also  controlled  for  in  the  regressions.  Because 
Elfenbeim, Hamilton, and Zenger (2008) indicate that size of the prior employer also 
affects self-employment transitions of wage-earners significantly. They show that prior 
employment in small firms increases the likelihood of self-employment relative to prior 
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employment in larger firms. In particular, this implication is valid for workers having 
positions at the lower and the upper tails of the skill distribution. In addition, it is known 
that employment volatility is inversely related to firm size (Davis and Haltiwanger, 1992; 
Davis et al., 1996; Rob, 1995; Shaffer,  2006). As shown by Parker (2004) and Robbins, 
Pantuosco, Parker, and Fuller (2000), large numbers of new jobs are created by small 
firms6.  However, these jobs tend to be less permanent than those created by large firms 
(Davis and Haltiwanger, 1992; Davis et al., 1996; Rob, 1995). Moreover, we also know 
that employer size and wage rates are positively correlated. That is, individuals having 
higher residual earnings work for large firms (Abowd et al., 1999; Brown and Medoff, 
1989; Acs, 1999). Namely, high-ability people are working for large firms rather than 
small firms. Consequently, we can infer that low-ability workers are hired by local small 
firms.  Thus,  low-ability  individuals  who  are  affected  significantly  from  high  local 
unemployment in their self-employment transitions are also more likely to be employees 
of small firms. Therefore, the observed positive correlation between local unemployment 
rates and the likelihood of entrepreneurship for low-skilled workers may be the result of a 
small firm effect. 
        The possibility of small-firm effect leads me to check the robustness of my results  
by controlling for firm size. To do so, I first analyze the role of prior employment in small 
firms in self-employment transitions of wage-earners at various skill levels (Table 8). 
6    In fact, their contributions to job creation are greater than those of large firms (Davis and Haltiwanger, 
1992).
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Table 8 : Probability of Becoming Self-Employed, 1993-1995;  (Marginal Effects)
  Dependent variable = 1 if self-employed in current year,  0  otherwise. 
(1) (2)
Age - 0.0009***
(0.0003)
- 0.0005
(0.0003)
Gender 0.0051
(0.0051)
0.0081
(0.0055)
Education      0.0031***
(0.0009)
     0.0036***
(0.0010)
Work Experience    0.0009**
(0.0003)
   0.0009**
(0.0004)
Small-Firm    0.0175***
(0.00473)
- 0.0146
(0.0157)
A1 ---- - 0.0177(0.0109)
A2 ---- - 0.0544***(0.0116)
A3 ---- - 0.0138*(0.0082)
A4 ---- 0.0005(0.0078)
A5 ---- Dropped
Small Firm Employees in A1 ----    0.0399**(0.0173)
Small Firm Employees in A2 ----      0.0657***(0.0188)
Small Firm Employees in A3 ---- 0.0241(0.0178)
Small Firm Employees in A4 ---- 0.0074(0.0185)
Small Firm Employees in A5 ---- Dropped
Pseudo R2 0.0722 0.1152
Observations 5,375 4,187
       Standard Errors are reported in parentheses. ***Significant at 1 %  level; **Significant at 5 %  level; *Significant at 10 %  level 
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     Then,  I  test  both  the  local  unemployment  effect  and  the  small  firm  effect 
simultaneously for each ability group (Table 9). Only one sample, 1993-1995, is used for 
this analysis. 
      Effects of personal characteristics like age, gender, education, and work experience 
are again controlled for in the logistic regressions presented in Table 8.7  The dummy 
variable  “Small-Firm”  identifies  prior  employment  in  small  firms.  The  estimate 
associated  with  this  variable  indicates  that  prior  employees  of  small  firms  are,  on 
average, more likely to be self-employed. My results are consistent with the findings of 
Elfenbeim, Hamilton, and Zenger (2008).
           To analyze the “small firm” effect in more detail, I add in column (2) of Table 8 
interaction  terms  that  allow  for  separate  small  firm  effects  in  each  ability  group. 
Employees of small firms in A1 and A2 are more likely to be entrepreneurs. Moreover, 
the associated marginal effects are statistically significant at the 5% and 1% levels for 
individuals in A1 and A2, respectively. Evidently, prior employment in small firms is a 
strong predictor of self-employment for individuals in lower ability groups.  Although 
workers in A3 and A4 show the same positive correlation between the probability of 
entering  self-employment  and  employment  in  small  firms,  the  coefficients  are  all 
7      Estimates are statistically significant for age, education level, and work experience but insignificant 
for gender. While education and work experience are positively correlated with the likelihood of self-
employment, age is negatively correlated. That is, more work experience and high education level are 
significant predictors of entrepreneurship.
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statistically insignificant.
Table 9 : Probability of Becoming Self-Employed, 1993-1995; (Marginal Effects)
Dependent variable = 1 if self-employed in current year,  0  otherwise.
Sub-samples by Ability Groups
Full 
Sample A1 A2 A3 A4 A
Age - 0.0004(0.0004)
- 0.0006
(0.0013)
0.0006
(0.0005)
- 0.0032**
(0.0012)
- 0.0003
(0.0014)
- 0.0013***
(0.0004)
Gender 0.0059
(0.0063)
0.0052
(0.0193)
- 0.0015
(0.0090)
- 0.0013
(0.0150)
0.0462**
(0.0234)
0.0149*
(0.0089)
Education 0.0040***
(0.0012)
0.0076*
(0.0041)
0.0019
(0.0020)
0.0065**
(0.0032)
0.0035
(0.0036)
0.0019
(0.0014)
Work 
Experience 0.0010**(0.0005)
0.0004
(0.0016)
- 0.0008
(0.0006)
0.0048***
(0.0014)
0.0014
(0.0015)
0.0005
(0.0005)
Small 
Firm 0.0174***
(0.0052)
0.0333**
(0.0155)
0.0296***
(0.0104)
0.0111
(0.0129)
- 0.0114
(0.0169)
0.0157
(0.0179)
Unemp. 
Rate
0.0017
(0.0074)
0.0004
(0.0097)
- 0.0038
(0.0037)
- 0.0138**
(0.0067)
- 0.0253***
(0.0096)
- 0.0134***
(0.0043)
Pseudo R2 0.0877 0.1309 0.2636 0.1780 0.2357 0.1526
Observations
. 4,187 723 563 715 451 1,108
   Standard Errors are reported in parentheses. 
   ***Significant at 1 %  level; **Significant at 5 %  level; *Significant at 10 %  level    
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        Entry into self-employment does not depend on prior employment in local small 
firms in the A5.  The result  contrasts  with the findings of Elfenbeim, Hamilton,  and 
Zenger (2008) who found that those entering into self-employment from small firms are 
drawn from both the upper and the lower tails of the skill distribution, and the association 
is much stronger for those from the upper tail of the distribution.
         My findings, however, indicate that those entering into self-employment from small 
firms are drawn from the lower tail of the skill distribution, and the association is stronger 
for individuals in A2 than the ones in A1.
     
        A logistic regression model is run for each ability group separately. Explanatory 
variables  representing  personal  characteristics,  prior  employment  in  small  firms,  and 
local unemployment rates are included. The associated estimates are displayed in Table 9.
8   Since I control for both local unemployment and small firm effects for each ability 
group in the last analysis, I can observe relative strengths of these effects at each ability 
level.
8    Estimates imply that education and work experience are positively correlated with the probability of 
being self-employed for all individuals from all ability levels. Both high level of education and more work 
experience are statistically significant predictors of self-employment however significance level of 
education is greater than that of work experience. Males are more likely to be self-employed than females 
at all ability levels. Estimates for gender are statistically significant only for individuals in A4 and A5. 
While high education level is a significant predictor of self-employment for workers in A1 and A3, more 
work experience is a significant predictors of self-employment only for those in A3. Only significant 
estimates for age are the ones for people in A3 and A5. These two results show negative correlations 
between age and probability of entry into entrepreneurship. That is, individuals in A3 and A5 are more 
likely to be self-employed when they are younger. 
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      Column (1) uses the full sample. Small firm employment raises the likelihood of 
transition into  self-employment. The estimated marginal effect is statistically significant 
at the 1% level. Therefore, it can be inferred that prior employment in small firms is a 
strong predictor of self-employment. Local unemployment has no significant effect on 
the probability of entry into self-employment. These results hold for sub-samples A1 and 
A2 as indicated by columns (2) and (3). This indicates that local unemployment is not a 
condition  forcing  low-ability workers  into  necessity entrepreneurship.  The small  firm 
effect is much stronger for them. Thus, it can be said that previously observed positive 
correlations between local unemployment rates and probability of being self-employed 
for low-skilled individuals are mostly due to the small firm effect.
       On the  other  hand,  prior  employment  in  small  firms has  no influence on the 
likelihood of self-employment for workers in A3, A4, and A5. That is, there is no small 
firm effect for high-ability  people constituting the upper 50 % of the skill distribution. 
However, these highly-skilled individuals are less likely to be entrepreneurs when local 
unemployment rates are high. In other words, opportunity entrepreneurship is affected 
negatively by high local unemployment. Associated significance levels, 5 % for A3 and 1 
% for other two groups, point out that these results are strong although sample size is 
moderate. In fact, it is the strongest for the top 25 % of the skill distribution. Since it is 
consistent with the literature, this outcome is as expected. It suggests that opportunity 
entrepreneurs  postpone  or  cancel  their  self-employment  plans  when  there  are  high 
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unemployment rates.
Conclusion
       This chapter presents results obtained after investigating the existence of a local 
unemployment  effect  on  entry  into  self-employment.  Initially,  I  showed  that  the 
probability of entry into self-employment is increasing in the local unemployment rate. 
Moreover, the correlation between local unemployment rates and the probability of entry 
into  self-employment  was found to be  positive  for  all  but  the  top  10  % of  the  skill 
distribution. For the top 10 % of the skill distribution, there is no correlation between 
them.  These results for low-ability workers are consistent with the theory of necessity 
entrepreneurship.  The  literature  indicates  that  individuals  with  lower  ability  levels 
become necessity entrepreneurs because they are forced into entrepreneurship by some 
external factors. From the estimates presented in this chapter, high local unemployment 
appears to be one of these external factors. The literature suggests that high-ability people 
are more likely to be opportunity entrepreneurs,  and I conjectured that they could be 
discouraged by high local unemployment. The initial results provided no support for this 
conjecture. However, the initial results may be confounded by the absence of a control 
for firm size.
        Low-ability individuals are more likely to be employees of small firms, prior  
employment in small firms increases the likelihood of entrepreneurship, and small firms 
are more sensitive to  the economic  fluctuations  that  cause changes  in  unemployment 
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rates. Therefore, the observed positive correlation between local unemployment rates and 
the probability of self-employment for low-skilled workers may be due to a small firm 
effect.  In  order  to  explore this  possibility,  I  checked the robustness  of  my results  by 
controlling for employment in small firms. Analysis of the small firm effect shows that 
prior employment in small firms, on average, increases the probability of entry into self-
employment. This inference is consistent with the literature. When this effect is tested by 
considering different skill levels of people, it is observed that prior employment in small 
firms is positively correlated with the likelihood of self-employment for workers in the 
first four ability groups, although estimates for A3 and A4 are statistically insignificant. 
For high-ability individuals, however, there is no correlation between the probability of 
self-employment and employment in small firms. Thus, my findings are consistent with 
the earlier literature only for low-skilled workers. 
 
         Last, I test the local unemployment effect and small firm effect simultaneously for 
each ability group. The results are highly significant despite the moderate sample size. 
While  prior  employment  in  small  firms  increases  the  likelihood  of  self-employment 
significantly, local unemployment rates have almost no effect for low-ability workers in 
A1 and A2. This means that high unemployment is not one of the factors forcing these 
low-skilled workers into necessity entrepreneurship. The small firm effect has a greater 
impact on their self-employment transitions than local unemployment effect. In contrast, 
these results are not valid for more skilled individuals in A3, A4 and A5. The estimates 
show  that  prior  employment  in  small  firms  has  no  influence  on  the  probability  of 
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becoming  self-employed  for  them.  Instead,  their  likelihood  of  entrepreneurship  is 
affected significantly by high local unemployment. Moreover, it is consistent with the 
literature that this impact is negative. Thus, high-ability workers in A3, A4, and A5 are 
less  likely  to  be  self-employed  when  local  unemployment  rates  are  high.  That  is, 
opportunity entrepreneurship is reduced by high unemployment. 
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III. CHAPTER 2 : ORGANIZATIONAL CAPITAL AND BARRIERS TO 
                                 FIRM FORMATION
Introduction
       This chapter  investigates how organizational capital constitutes a barrier to firm 
formation by individuals at different skill levels over time. As indicated in the literature, 
entrepreneurial  behaviors of people having distinct ability levels are not the same. In 
particular, individuals at the lower and upper ends of the skill distribution are more likely 
to be self-employed Elfenbeim, Hamilton, and Zenger,(2008). This means that these low- 
and high-ability people are the ones who establish firms that are crucial for the economy. 
Therefore, analyzing factors that cause changes in the occupational decisions over time, 
and that affect firm formation activities of individuals from various ability groups is an 
important topic to study. 
         In this section, organizational capital refers to human capital and physical capital.  
As indicated by Brynjolfsson, Hitt, and Yang (2002), production requires not only such 
traditional  factors  as  capital  and  labor  but  also  skills,  organizational  structures  and 
processes, culture,  and other factors collectively referred to “intangible assets”. These 
intangible assets are often large in magnitude and have important productivity benefits. In 
addition, Hubbard and O'Brien (2009) define human capital as the accumulated training 
and skills  that  workers possess.  Therefore,  estimated personal ability or skill  level  of 
individuals which is also within the intangible assets is taken as human capital in this 
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chapter. The amount of organizational capital required for firm formation depends on the 
type of industry which will  be chosen for the new firm. In other words, whether the 
industry is an ability-intensive industry or a capital-intensive industry is  an important 
criteria for a potential entrepreneur to consider while founding a firm9. A capital-intensive 
industry  refers  to  an  industry  requiring  substantial  amount  of  investments  in  capital 
assets, and consequently requires more liquidity for the production of goods. An ability-
intensive  industry,  however,  is  an  industry  requiring  more  human  capital  instead  of 
monetary capital for the production of goods. Since people have different skill levels10 
and different amounts of initial wealth11, required organizational capital for the new firm 
could become an entry barrier for them. 
       In order  to explore the role  of organizational  capital  in firm formation,  I  first 
construct  a  model  simulating  interactions  among  a  representative  utility  maximizing 
agent and his/her profit maximizing firm. Second, I analyze testable implications of my 
model  empirically.  Both industry types,  capital-intensive and ability-intensive,  require 
funds for investment spending in the model. However, the amount of funds necessary for 
a capital-based firm is greater than funds necessary for an ability-based firm. Moreover, 
high  human  capital  is  also  necessary  for  an  ability-based  firm.  Thus,  high  skill 
requirements  induce  the  most  able  individuals  to  found  firms  in  an  ability-intensive 
industry. Firm formation by individuals in distinct places of the skill distribution depend 
9 Bates (1990) indicates the importance of human capital as an input in entrepreneurial activities. 
10 As indicated by Jovanovic (1994), personal skills affect firm formation activities of individuals.
11 Lack of high initial wealth constitutes a liquidity constraint for people in my study. As implied by 
Jovanovic and Evans (1989), liquidity constraint affects entrepreneurial choice.  
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on their initial wealth and saving behavior. That is, if they have high initial wealth, and if  
the monetary return from a capital-intensive industry is greater than those from an ability-
intensive industry and paid-work, then they prefer to found firms in a capital-intensive 
industry when young. Another option of self-employment for young individuals who do 
not have high initial wealth but enough liquidity is to form a firm in an ability-intensive 
industry  if  their  skill  levels  allow.  If  the  monetary  return  from  an  ability-intensive 
industry is greater than those from a capital-intensive industry and paid-work, then they 
found new ventures in an ability-intensive industry in the first period of their life even 
though their initial wealth are limited. Otherwise, they stay at their current jobs and save 
to  accumulate  the  required  funds  for  investment  in  a  capital-intensive  or  an  ability-
intensive industry. These people establish their own firms in the second period of their 
life by using their savings. 
         In order to analyze the testable predictions of my theoretical model, observations on 
a sample of individuals in the PSID are used. A panel is constructed for the period 2003-
2007.  This  time period is  selected for the sample because it  includes  all  information 
needed for the analysis. 
        A significant empirical challenge is to construct measures of personal ability. For 
this purpose, I construct an indicator for innate ability from the residuals obtained in a 
regression of labor earnings on age, gender, education, and work experience (cf. Behrman 
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and Rosenzweig, 1999). Education is not taken as a part of ability because two people 
having the same education level can earn different incomes even though they both do 
identical jobs as a result of their distinct personal abilities. Individuals are placed in four 
ability groups, denoted by G1 through G4, with G1 representing the lowest ability group. 
These are not quantiles. Group G1 accounts for the first 25 percent of the observations, 
G2 accounts for the next thirty five percent, G3 accounts for the next thirty percent, and 
G5 represents the highest ten percent.
       Mixed empirical results about the predictions of the model are observed. That is, 
high-ability  individuals  in  G4  have  the  greatest  monetary  return  from their  personal 
ability levels if  they found ability-based firms whereas,  they have the least  monetary 
return if  they become paid-employees.  Thus, more personal ability makes them more 
likely to establish ability-based firms. In contrast, low-ability individuals in G1 have the 
greatest  monetary return from their  personal  ability levels  if  they choose to  be paid-
employees. In other words, their low personal ability constitutes an entry barrier to an 
ability-intensive industry. However, it is empirically shown that they are more likely to 
work as wage-earners than to found their own firms when personal ability level increases. 
Both industry types require investment spending for firm formation although it is less for 
an  ability-intensive  industry.  This  means  that  liquidity  constrained  people  face  entry 
barriers in both industries. Therefore, high wealth makes individuals more likely to found 
capital-based  and  ability-based  firms.  Since  liquidity  constraints  faced  by  young 
individuals  can  be removed by using  savings  when old,  entry into  both industries  is 
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predicted  to  increase  with  age.  Empirical  results  indicate  that  entry  into  an  ability-
intensive industry often happens later in life. This result is valid especially for individuals 
in G1 and G2. Entry into a capital-intensive industry is also more likely to happen later in 
life for individuals in G1, but not for those in G3 and G4. 
      This chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 presents theoretical model, section 3 
exhibits testable implications of the model, section 4 shows empirical  analysis, and the 
last section offers some concluding remarks.
The Model
The Environment:
        I consider an agent that lives for two periods. The agent has two occupational  
alternatives during his life. He/She can form his/her own firm or be a paid-worker12. If 
the agent decides to establish a firm, he/she has to choose which industry to enter in order 
to maximize his/her firm's profit  Π which is presented in equation (16). There are two 
types of industries, capital-intensive and ability-intensive, that can be chosen for the new 
firm. A capital-intensive industry refers to an industry that needs a substantial amount of 
investment in capital assets. Therefore, it requires more liquidity for the production of 
goods. An ability-intensive industry, in contrast, is an industry that needs more human 
capital than physical capital for the production. Since the agent chooses the industry that 
12   That is, this representative agent can supply his labor either by as a worker or as an entrepreneur 
[Kihlstrom and Laffont (1979)].
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yields maximum earning for his own firm, profit of his firm becomes earning function of 
the industry chosen for the firm as shown in the Firm's Problem section. Production in 
both  industries  depends  on  a  time-invariant  heterogeneous  personal  ability  level, A, 
which raises entrepreneurial earning  f.  Their earning functions have the same general 
form as follows:
                                               f ij=k ijA γij                                                               (5)
 where 
        
            
            
In equation (5),  γij   and  kij  denote the marginal product of personal ability and the amount 
of capital required for industry-i in period-j, respectively. 
Assumption 1 :   k
1
j >   k
2
j >  0. That  is,  both capital-intensive  and ability-intensive 
industries need positive capital for the production. However, a capital-intensive industry 
requires more capital investment than an ability-intensive industry.  
The capital necessary for industry-i is a fixed cost of establishing a firm in industry-i. 
Therefore, it constitutes an entry condition for that particular industry.
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i={1 if industry type is a capital-intensive industry2 if industry type is an ability-intensive industry}
j={1 if current period is the first period2 if current period is the second period}
Assumption 2 :  0 < γ1j < γ2j. The marginal product of personal ability is greater for an 
ability-intensive industry than that for a capital-intensive industry.
If the agent chooses to be a paid-employee, he earns a wage given by equation (6). 
                                                       W=W 0A γ                                                                (6)
where W0  is the base wage, and γ  is the marginal contribution of personal ability to the 
wage.  The wage is composed of two parts. The first part is the base wage which is set 
according to personal characteristics like age, gender, education, and work experience. 
The second part is directly proportional to the employee's personal ability level  A. 
 Assumption 3 :   γ < γ1j < γ2j . That is, the marginal contribution of personal ability level 
to the wage is less than marginal contributions of personal ability level to entrepreneurial 
earnings.
Analysis of the Environment:
         Graphs of the wage and two production functions are presented in Figure-6. In this 
figure,   k1j   represents  physical  capital  investment  necessary  for  a  capital-intensive 
industry in period-j whereas,  k2j  represents physical capital investment necessary for an 
ability-intensive industry in period-j. 
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                      Figure-6: Production functions of two industry types and wage 
    
        The variable A*, given in equation (7), is the critical personal ability level at which 
two industry types  yield the same entrepreneurial  earnings  after  firm formation.  It  is 
given by
                                                                                                                             (7)
        Individuals with personal ability level greater than A* are classified as high-ability 
individuals in this chapter.  Since A* is the ability level at which having a capital-based 
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firm and having an ability-based firm yield identical incomes, future entrepreneurs are 
indifferent between the two industry alternatives at this point. It is more profitable to have 
a venture in an ability-intensive industry for people whose personal ability levels are 
greater than A* as indicated by Figure-1. The high ability level requirement of an ability-
based firm does not constitute a barrier for them because they are already high-ability 
individuals. This result for high-ability people is presented in Result 1. 
Result 1 :  f2j > f1j   when  A > A*. That is, having a firm in an ability-intensive industry 
brings greater monetary return than having a firm in a capital-intensive industry for high-
ability people whose personal ability levels are greater than  A*.
        The model implies that having a capital-based firm is more profitable for people 
whose personal ability levels are less than A*. Since these individuals do not have the 
high  human  capital  necessary  for  an  ability-based  firm,  they  are  constrained  by the 
required high ability level. Therefore, setting up a capital-based firm brings more earning 
for them. Result 2 presents this result. 
Result 2 :  f2j < f1j   when A < A*.  That is, having a firm in a capital-intensive industry 
brings greater entrepreneurial income than having a firm in an ability-intensive industry 
for people having personal ability levels less than A*.
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        There are two more break-even personal ability levels as A1 and A2. A1 represents a 
personal ability level at which wage and earning from a capital-intensive firm are equal 
after the firm is formed. Similarly, A2 shows a personal ability level at which the wage 
and earnings from an ability-intensive firm are same after firm formation. They are as 
follows:
                                                                               (8)
Result 3 :  A2 > A1  . That is, cut-off personal ability level between wage and earning from 
an ability-based firm  is greater than cut-off  personal ability level between wage and 
earning from a capital-based firm.
   
       People having personal ability levels less than A1 are classified to be low-ability 
individuals in this chapter. Since A1 is the ability level at which wage and earning from a 
capital-based firm are the same, people are indifferent between being paid-employees and 
having firms in a capital-intensive industry at this ability level. However, their decisions 
change along with the positions of their personal ability levels with respect to A1. That is, 
they prefer to have capital-based firms if their personal ability levels are greater than A1. 
Since being a firm-owner in a capital-intensive industry yields higher income than being 
a paid-employee for them, they enter into a capital-intensive industry by founding firms. 
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A1=
W 0−k1
j
γ1
j−γ
and A2=
W 0−k 2
j
γ2
j−γ
This means that having personal ability level less than A1 constitutes an entry barrier to a 
capital-intensive industry. In other words, it is not profitable to set up a capital-based firm 
for the ones whose positions are at the lowest end of the skill distribution because of their 
lower human capital. Result 4 states this result. 
Result 4 :   f1j > W  when  A > A1.  That is, being a firm-owner in a capital-intensive 
industry brings greater monetary return than being a paid-employee for people whose 
personal ability levels are greater than  A1.
        Analogous to A1, A2 is the personal ability level at which wage and earning from an 
ability-based firm are identical.  This means that people are indifferent between being 
paid-employees  and having firms in  an  ability-intensive industry at  this  ability level. 
However,  they  decide  to  have  ability-based  firms  if  their  personal  ability  levels  are 
greater than A2. Since being firm-owners in an ability-intensive industry yields greater 
earning than being paid-employees for them, they enter into an ability-intensive industry 
by setting  up  new firms.  This  means  that  having  personal  ability  level  less  than  A2 
constitutes an entry barrier for an ability-intensive industry. This outcome can be seen in 
Result 5. 
Result 5 :  f2j > W  when  A > A2.  That is, being a firm-owner in an ability-intensive 
industry brings greater earning  than being a paid-employee for people whose personal 
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ability levels are greater than  A2.
        The three critical ability levels, A1, A2, and A*, divide individuals into four ability 
groups for which the best occupational choices are different. As described earlier, people 
whose personal ability levels are greater than A* are classified as high-ability individuals 
whereas, others whose personal ability levels are less than A1 are classified as low-ability 
individuals.  Being  a  paid-employee  is  the  best  way  of  earning  more  income. 
Consequently it is the best occupational choice for low-ability people. On the other hand, 
since having a firm in an ability-intensive industry is the way to earn the greatest income 
for high-ability individuals, it is the best occupational alternative for them. Results 6 and 
7 state these results for low-ability and high-ability individuals, respectively.  
Result 6 :  W >  f1j > f2j   when  A1 > A. That is, being a paid-employee brings the greatest 
monetary return for low-ability people whose personal ability levels are less than  A1.
Result 7 :  f2j > f1j  > W  when  A > A*  > A2 > A1.  That is, having a firm in an ability-
intensive  industry  brings  the  greatest  income  for  high-ability  people  whose  personal 
ability levels are greater than  A*.
       Having a firm in a capital-intensive industry is the way to earn the highest income for 
the two groups of people with personal ability levels between A1 and A*. However, since 
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capital-intensive  industry  requires  more  spending  for  physical  investment,  their 
occupational  choices  depend  on the  amounts  of  their  initial  wealth.  Results  8  and 9 
present results for these two ability groups.
Result 8 :  f1j > f2j  > W when  A*  > A > A2 > A1.  That is, having a firm in a capital-
intensive industry brings the greatest monetary return for people having personal ability 
levels between A2 and  A*.
Result 9 :  f1j > W > f2j   when  A2 > A > A1. That is, having a firm in a capital-intensive 
industry brings the greatest earning for people having personal ability levels between A2 
and  A1.
Household's Problem: 
        The agent lives for two periods. He is born with one unit of labor time. As it can be  
seen from the objective function, he gets utility from both first-period and second-period 
consumptions  C1 and  C2. He  makes a consumption-saving decision in the first period. 
That is, he saves some portion of his first period income M1 whereas, he consumes all of 
his second period income M2 as indicated by two budget constraints (10) and (11).
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                                       MaxU= lnC1β ln C2                                       (9)
                                                         
subject to
                                                            C1S=M 1                                                                (10)
                                                 C2=M 2                                                     (11)
where
  
M 1=Max {Π i
1θ−k i
1 ,W θ }                                                                                           (12) 
  
  (13) 
where  θ, S, and r denote initial wealth, saving, and interest rate. There is no borrowing. 
Assumption 4 :  Initial wealth, θ, is positive at the beginning of the first period.
         The agent's incomes in the first and the second periods depend on the decision of 
setting up a firm or staying as a wage-earner. That is, if he owns a firm, his income will 
mainly be the profit, Π, of his firm. Profit of his firm depends on the selected industry as 
shown by equation  (20).  However,  if  he  works  as  a  paid-employee,  his  income will 
mainly be his wage. The decision to found a firm means spending some part of initial 
wealth  for  investment.  The  amount  of  investment  required  depends  on  the  industry 
chosen for the new venture. A capital-intensive industry requires more physical investment, 
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M 2={Π 1
21r θS−k1
1 if A Capital-Based Firm-Owner in the First Period
Π 2
21r θS−k2
1 if An Ability-Based Firm-Owner in the First Period
Max {Π i
21r θS−k i
2 , W1r θS } if Wage-Earner in the First Period}
while an ability-intensive industry requires less physical investment. Thus, the amount of initial  
wealth must be high enough for the chosen industry. 
Assumption 5 :   There is no perfect foresight in the model. In other words, the agent 
does not see or predict the second period cases. Occupational decisions are made at the 
beginnings of the first and the second periods.
        The decision to found a firm or stay in the current job is made by the household at 
the beginning of each period. In particular, if the household founds his own firm at the 
beginning of the first period, his first period income will be profit of his firm plus part of 
his initial wealth left after paying for investment. However, if he decides to stay in his 
current paid-work, his  income will  be his  wage plus his  initial  wealth.  As shown by 
equation (12), self-employment decision therefore the first period income level depends 
on relative magnitudes of entrepreneurial and paid-work earnings. That is, if monetary 
return from being a firm-owner is greater than that from a paid-work, he founds his own 
firm. Monetary return from being a firm-owner depends on the industry chosen for the 
new venture. Earning from an ability-based firm is greater for high-ability individuals 
even though they have less wealth. On the other hand, monetary return from a capital-
based firm is greater for people having lower ability but more wealth.
Assumption 6 :  If the agent decides to found a firm in one of the industry types in his 
first period of life, he continues operating the same firm in the second period. In other 
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words, there is no switch from one industry to the other industry while becoming self-
employed.
       As implied by equation (13), the second period income of the agent depends on his  
occupational decision made in  the first  period.  That is,  if  he has his  own firm when 
young, he continues operating the same firm when old. In this case, his total income is his 
profit  plus  his  total  wealth  which  includes  some  part  of  his  initial  wealth  left  after 
investment payment and his saving plus interest earning from his total wealth. However, 
if he does not have his own firm in the first period, he can found it or can stay as a wage-
earner in the second period. Since he is old now and worked when young, he has savings 
that increased his total wealth. That is, if he could not establish his own firm because of 
limited liquidity when young,  he has  an opportunity to  found it  now when old.  The 
decision about up his own firm in the second period also depends on the magnitudes of 
monetary returns from self-employment and paid-work. If his total income from staying 
as a wage-earner is greater, then he chooses to continue as an employee. But, if the return 
from having a firm is greater, he has to decide which industry to enter. Since he has more 
funds now, he has an opportunity to remove the barriers to founding a firm in a capital-
intensive or in an ability-intensive industry. However if he wants his new firm to be in an 
ability-intensive  industry,  he  has  to  consider  his  own ability  level  in  addition  to  his 
wealth. That is, his personal ability level can constitute another entry barrier to an ability-
intensive-industry. If he has lower personal ability, founding his own firm in a capital-
intensive  industry  brings  more  monetary  return.  But,  if  he  is  a  high-ability  person 
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meaning that he also has high human capital necessary for an ability-based firm, he can 
choose  either  the  capital-intensive  or  the  ability-intensive  industry for  the  new firm. 
When the household's problem is solved for C1, S, and C2, as shown by Appendix-III, the 
following results are obtained.
                                                                        (14) 
                                                                        (15) 
                                                                           (16) 
where
        
   
                 (17) 
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S= β1 β M 1 11 β1r Y 2
C 2= β 1r 1β M 1 β1 β Y 2
M 1={
Wθ if AA1
П 1
1θ−k 1
1 if A1AA2 , A2AA
* and k 1
1θ
П 2
1θ−k 2
1 if A2AA
* and A*A and k 2
1θk1
1
Wθ if A1AA2 and k 1
1θ
Wθ if A2AA
* , A*A and k 2
1θ
}
C1= 11 β M 1 11β1r Y 2
  
      (18) 
        The variables C1, C2, and S indicate that the consumption and saving behavior of the 
agent depends on personal ability and initial wealth. The results for  C1,  C2, and  S are 
calculated in terms of  M1 and  Y2 whose values differ along with personal ability and 
initial wealth. The variable  M1 denotes the first-period income whereas,  Y2 denotes the 
second period income without saving. That is, Y2 includes the wage or profit of the new 
firm depending on the chosen second-period occupation, and initial wealth or the amount 
of initial wealth left after investment payment with interest earned from them. However, 
M2 given in equation (19) shows total second-period income that also contains saving and 
interest earning it brings. 
 (19) 
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Y 2={
W 1r θ if AA1
Π 1
21r θ−k 1
1 if A1AA2 , A2AA
* and k 1
1θ
Π 2
21r θ−k 2
1 if A2AA
* and A*A and k 2
1θk 1
1
Π 1
21r θ−k 1
2 if A1AA2 and k 1
1θ
Π 2
21r θ−k 2
2 if A2AA
* , A*A and k 2
1θ
}
M 2={
W1r θS  if AA1 , A2AA
* , A*A , A1AA2 and k 2
2θS
П 1
21r θ−k 1
1S  if A1AA2 and A2AA
*
П 2
21r θ−k 2
1S  if A2AA
* , A*A
П 1
21r θ−k 1
2S  if A1AA2 , A2AA
* and θSk1
2
П 2
21r θ−k 2
2S  if A2AA
* , A*A and k 2
2θSk1
2
}
       Individuals  whose personal  ability levels are  less  than  A1 do not  change their 
occupations over time. That is, low-ability people with personal ability levels less than A1 
become wage-earners both in the first and the second periods of their lives. Because, they 
earn the greatest income by being paid-employees as indicated by Result-6.  M1 shows 
that low-ability people's income in the first period consists of wage and initial wealth. 
And their second-period income contains wage, initial wealth, saving, and interest earned 
from both initial wealth and saving.
      Since high-ability individuals whose personal ability levels are greater than A* have 
the greatest monetary return from being entrepreneurs in an ability-intensive industry as 
shown by Result-7, their best choice is to be ability-based firm-owners in both periods of 
their lives. However, this can be achieved only if initial wealth is greater than k21 which is 
the capital necessary for ability-based firm formation in the first period. Thus, if they 
have enough liquidity for an ability-intensive industry,  their  M1 includes profit  of the 
ability-based firm and the amount left from initial wealth after investment spending for 
the new firm. M2 contains profit of the ability-based firm, amount left from initial wealth 
after investment spending done in the first period for the new firm, saving, and their 
interest earnings. If they do not have enough money to create an ability-based firm, they 
become wage-earners in the first period. After working as paid-employees in the first 
period,  their  second-period  employment  choices  depend  on  their  total  second-period 
wealth.  Total  second-period  wealth  is  composed  of  initial  wealth  and  saving.  If  the 
amount  of  capital  needed  for  an  ability-based  firm formation  is  less  than  their  total 
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second-period  wealth,  they  become  ability-based  firm-owners.  Therefore,  their  M1 is 
wage plus initial  wealth. And their  M2 includes profit of the ability-based firm, amount 
left from initial wealth and saving after investment spending done in the second period 
for the new firm, and their interest earnings. On the other hand, if their total second-
period wealth is less than  k22, they continue working as paid-employees in the second 
period. In this case, M1 consists of wage and initial wealth. And M2 contains wage, initial 
wealth, saving, and interest earned from both initial wealth and saving. 
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          Figure-7: Occupational Choices According to Initial Wealth and Personal Ability
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          Occupational choices of individuals according to wealth and personal ability are  
also shown in Figure-7 given above13. For people having personal ability levels between 
A1 and A2, there are three optimal solutions. In the first solution, they choose to establish 
firms in a capital-intensive industry when young and continue operating the same firms 
when old. They choose to be capital-based firm-owners in both periods of their  lives 
because Result-9 proves that this choice supplies the greatest income for them.  M1 and 
M2 have  two-period-profits  of  the  capital-based  firm and an  amount  left  from initial 
wealth after investment spending undertaken in the first period together with its interest 
earning. Saving plus interest  is also in  M2.  Since a capital-intensive industry requires 
more  investment,  a  high  amount  of  initial  wealth  is  necessary  for  this  solution. 
Consequently, liquidity constrained individuals become wage-earners when young, and 
then  they  found  capital-based  firms  by  using  their  savings  when  old  in  the  second 
solution. They choose to be wage-earners in the first period in this solution because being 
a wage-earner brings greater monetary return than being an ability-based firm-owner for 
them as shown by Result-9. Moreover, there is no switch from one industry to the other 
industry  while  becoming  self-employed  as  stated  in  Assumption-6.  The  first-period 
income,  M1,  for  this  solution  consists  of  wage and  initial  wealth.  The  second-period 
income, on the other hand, has profit of the capital-based firm plus total wealth which 
includes  an amount  of  funds left  from the initial  wealth and saving after  investment 
spending, and interest saving yields. For the second solution to exist,  required capital 
13   Since occupational decisions are made at the beginnings of the first and second periods, wealth in this  
figure refers to the amount of funds people have at the beginning of each period. In other words, wealth  
denotes initial wealth at the beginning of the first period whereas, it denotes initial wealth plus saving at the 
beginning of the second period.  
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investment spending for a capital-based firm should be less than saving and initial wealth. 
Therefore, if this condition does not hold, individuals in this ability interval continue to 
be paid-employees in the second period. As a result, their  M1  values include wage and 
initial wealth whereas, their M2  becomes summation of wage, initial wealth, saving, and 
interests earned from both initial wealth and saving.
       There are five optimal solutions for the last group of people whose personal ability 
levels  are  greater  than  A2 and less  than  A*.  They have  the same occupations  in  both 
periods of their lives in the first and the second solutions. That is, people in this ability 
interval choose to found capital-based firms when young and continue operating them 
when old in the first solution. And they set up firms in an ability-intensive industry when 
young and continue with the same firms when old in the second solution. Not all these 
individuals choose to set up firms in a capital-intensive industry although Result-8 proofs 
that it  is the most profitable outcome for them. That is,  ones with high initial  wealth 
choose to found capital-based firms whereas, others with less wealth but enough liquidity 
for an ability-intensive industry choose to found ability-based firms. That is, an ability-
intensive industry also requires liquidity but it is not as high as the wealth necessary for a 
capital-intensive industry.  Since  Assumption-6 states that  there is  no switch from one 
industry to the other industry while becoming self-employed, these people whose initial 
wealth is less for a capital-based firm but enough for an ability-based firm do not choose 
to form firms in an ability-intensive industry in the first period, and then establish firms 
in a capital-intensive industry in the second period.  In other words, they cannot switch 
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from an ability-intensive industry to a capital-intensive industry. Moreover, individuals 
having initial wealth which is not high enough for a capital-intensive industry do not 
choose to be wage-earners even though they have enough initial wealth for an ability-
based firm with the aim of establishing capital-based firms in the second period by using 
their savings. Because, there is no perfect foresight in the model. In other words, the 
agent  does  not  see or  predict  the second-period  cases  as  indicated  by Assumption-5. 
Occupational decisions are made at the beginnings of the first and the second periods 
without future intentions. M1 and M2 of the first solution include two-period-profits of the 
capital-based firm and amount left from initial wealth after investment spending done in 
the first period for the new firm. Analogously, M1 and M2 of the second solution contain 
two-period-profits of the ability-based firm and the amount left from initial wealth after 
investment  spending  for  the  new  firm.  Savings  together  with  interests  earned  from 
savings and the amount of wealth left are also in M2 values of these two solutions. Other 
three  cases  show  another  option  for  individuals  having  liquidity  less  than  the  one 
necessary for an ability-based firm formation. They indicate that people in this ability 
group are wage-earners in the first period.  Thus,  M1  for these cases is wage plus initial 
wealth.  However,  the  second  period  occupations  are  different  for  these  last  three 
solutions. That is, people become capital-based firm-owners in the third solution, they 
become ability-based firm-owners in the fourth solution, and lastly they continue to be 
paid-employees  in  the  fifth  solution.  If  wage-earners  in  this  ability  interval  can 
accumulate  high  wealth  by  saving,  they  become  firm-owners  in  a  capital-intensive 
industry in the second period of their lives. In this case,  M2  is the profit of the capital-
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based firm plus amount left from initial wealth and saving after investment spending for 
the new firm plus interests earned from them. The fourth solution indicates that paid-
employees can found ability-based firms in the second period by using their savings if 
accumulated money is enough to pay the capital investment necessary for that type of 
firm. M2 value of this solution is composed of the profit of the ability-based firm, amount 
left from initial wealth and saving after investment spending for the new firm, and their 
interest earnings. In the fifth solution, they are paid-employees in both periods of their 
lives because their initial wealth and the second-period accumulated wealth are not high 
enough to establish any type of firm. Therefore, M2 of the fifth solution has wage, saving, 
initial wealth, and interests earned from saving and initial wealth.
The Firm's Problem: 
       If the agent chooses to set up a firm, he becomes a potential entrepreneur and has to  
face the following problem of a profit maximizing firm.
                                            П j=Max [ f 1j , f 2j]                                            (20)
subject to
                                                k i1  θ                                                        (21)
   
                                                        k i
2  θS                                                            (22)
 
                                                        k 2
j  k1
j                                                                (23)
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                                                            γ1
j  γ2
j                                                             (24)
where Πij  is the profit of a firm operating in industry-i in period-j. 
      As presented by the objective function of the firm, a potential entrepreneur has two 
industry alternatives  from which  he will  choose maximum-yielding  one for  his  firm. 
Production functions of these alternative industries are as shown in equation (5). That is, 
they both have exogenously given personal ability level, A, and a capital  kij of industry-i 
in period-j. Exogenous interest rate,  r, also plays an important role in the potential firm 
owner's decision together with saving and initial wealth. Representative agent chooses the 
industry that fits his liquidity and personal ability constraints as well as maximizes his 
firm's profit, Π.  In other words, his initial wealth has to be greater than  ki1 which denotes 
capital required for industry-i in the first period. Moreover, his second period wealth must 
be greater than  ki2  that shows capital invested for industry-i in the second period. As it 
can  be  seen  from inequality  (22),  his  wealth  at  the  beginning  of  the  second  period 
consists  of  his  initial  wealth  plus  saving.  As  shown  by  the  third  constraint,  capital 
necessary for a capital-intensive industry is greater than that necessary for an ability-
intensive  industry  in  the  same  period.  On  the  other  hand,  marginal  contribution  of 
personal ability is greater in the ability-intensive industry than capital-intensive industry 
as indicated in the last constraint. Maximized profits for the first and the second periods 
are
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                           (25) 
                                                                                                                                                      
(26) 
        Values of maximized profits differ according to ability group. That is, since low-
ability individuals (i.e., the ones whose personal ability levels are less than A1) choose to 
be  paid-employees  in  both  periods  of  their  lives,  their  maximized  profits  are  zero. 
Similarly, since high-ability individuals whose personal ability levels are greater than A* 
choose to have ventures in an ability-intensive industry in both periods of their lives if  
they have enough liquidity, their maximized profits in this case are f2. However, if they do 
not have liquidity necessary for an ability-intensive industry, they become wage-earners 
in the first period. Therefore, their first-period profits are zero. Paid-employees in this 
ability  interval  become  ability-based  firm-owners  in  the  second  period  if  they  can 
accumulate required funds for the investment through saving. If they can do it, then their 
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Π i
1={
0 if AA1
П 1
1= f 1
1 if A1AA2 , A2AA
* and k 1
1θ
П 2
1= f 2
1 if A2AA
* and A*A and k 2
1θk 1
1
0 if A1AA2 and k1
1θ
0 if A2AA
* , A*A and k2
1θ
}
Π i
2={
0 if AA1 , A2AA
* , A*A , A1AA2 and k 2
2θS
П1
2= f 1
2 if A1AA2 and A2AA
*
П2
2= f 2
2 if A2AA
* , A*A
П1
2= f 1
2 if A1AA2 , A2AA
* and θSk1
2
П2
2= f 2
2 if A2AA
* , A*A and k 2
2θSk 1
2
}
second-period profits are f2, otherwise their second-period profits are zero. Because, they 
continue to work as paid-employees in the second period if their accumulated funds are 
not high enough for investment. 
      Individuals having personal ability levels between A1 and A2 decide to have firms in a 
capital-intensive industry if their initial wealth allow in both periods of their lives. In this 
case, their maximized profits are f1. However, if they do not have enough initial wealth, 
they become paid-employees  in the first  period,  and then they establish capital-based 
firms in the second period by using their savings accumulated during the first period. 
Consequently, their first period profits are zero and the second period profits are f1. The 
third case for these individuals is being paid-employees in both periods of their lives. 
This last case occurs if they cannot accumulate funds necessary for a capital-intensive 
industry. Thus, their profits in both periods are zero.
       People whose personal ability levels are greater than A2 and less than A*  establish 
either capital-based or ability-based firms in the first period, and continue operating the 
same firms in the second period of their life. Thus, if they decide to set up firms in an 
ability intensive-industry, their profits are  f2. But, if their choices are to found capital-
based  firms,  their  profits  become  f1.  In  addition,  they  become paid-employees  when 
young, and establish capital-based firms when old if  their  accumulated wealth enable 
payments for investment in the third case. Thus, their first-period profits are zero and the 
second-period profits are f1 .But, if their second-period funds are high enough only for an 
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ability-intensive  industry,  they  become  firm-owners  in  this  types  of  the  industry. 
Therefore, their first-period profits are zero and the second-period profits are  f2  in the 
fourth case. The fifth case exists if their second-period total wealth are so low that they 
cannot found their own firms. Then, their profits in both periods of their lives are zero 
because their occupational choices are being paid-employees.  
Testable Implications of the Model
         The model implies four predictions all of which are examined against data. The first 
prediction  is  about  how  wealth  affects  occupational  decisions  and  firm  formation 
activities of individuals. Even though a capital-intensive industry requires more capital 
investment  than an ability-intensive industry,  they both require  wealth for the set  up. 
Prediction-1 states the first testable implication of the model as follows:
Prediction 1:  Wealthy people are more likely to enter into self-employment by founding 
firms  in  both  capital-intensive  and  ability-intensive  industries.  That  is,  both  industry 
types require wealth. 
     The second prediction of the model is related with the timing of establishing firms. 
Since individuals can save and accumulate wealth necessary for forming firms over time, 
the model implies that liquidity constrained young people can become firm-owners in 
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both capital-intensive and ability-intensive industries  later  in  life.  That  is,  they found 
firms when they get older by using their savings. Prediction-2 presents this implication.
Prediction 2:  Entries into both industry types, capital-intensive and ability-intensive, 
will often happen later in life.
    Prediction-3 states the third prediction of the model. This prediction describes the 
industry preferences of high-ability individuals. Since individuals at the upper end of the 
skill  distribution  have  high  personal  ability  level  required  for  an  ability-intensive 
industry, they are more likely to found ability-based firms.
Prediction 3:  High-ability people are more likely to enter ability-intensive industry.
Last prediction concerns occupational choices of low-ability individuals. Working as a 
wage-earner  is  the  optimal  occupational  choice  for  them due to  their  lower  personal 
ability levels.
Prediction 4:  Low-ability people are more likely to do wage-work.
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Empirical Analysis
Data and Empirical Methods:
         In order to explore the impact of organizational capital on the firm formation 
activities of people, I am going to study testable implications of my theoretical model in 
this empirical part. For this purpose, I use two-year panel data constructed from the Panel 
Study of Income Dynamics (PSID).  My data contain 13,886 individuals in years 2003-
2007. I choose this time period for data because it has all information that I need for this 
study. I use household heads in my sample because they are family members about whom 
the greatest amount of information is available. 
       Since people are divided into four categories according to their personal ability levels 
in theoretical model, I have to measure personal ability level and distinguish individuals 
in  my  sample  accordingly  in  this  empirical  part.  Total  labor  income  of  individuals 
depends on  individual characteristics like age, gender, education, work experience, and 
personal ability. We can measure age, gender, education, and work experience but we 
cannot measure personal ability level directly. There are two ways of measuring ability 
used in literature. The first, which is used by Elfenbeim, Hamilton, and Zenger (2008) 
holds  the  education  level  constant.  They  construct  a  percentile  rank  in  the  skill 
distribution separately for people having the same highest degree. They measure relative 
ability as the position of a given individual within the pay distribution in a given year 
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among individuals with the same highest degree. Their method seems logical because we 
observe  large  income  differences  among  people  having  identical  observable  human 
capital. However, this method ignores the impacts of work experience, age, and gender 
on  personal  labor  income.  These  additional  characteristics  can  also  create  large 
differences in labor income. The one with more work experience can earn more than 
others although all have identical highest degrees.
       The second way of measuring personal ability is to use residual income as a proxy. 
Juhn,  Murphy,  and  Pierce  (1993)  use  this  method  to  determine  ability  levels  of 
individuals and therefore their relative positions in the skill distribution. This is a more 
logical  way of measuring ability level.  It  controls for  the effects  of age,  gender,  and 
education level on personal labor income and uses the residual as a measure of ability. As 
Behrman and Rosenzweig (1999) indicate,  ability has been used as the rubric for all 
unmeasured earnings endowments,  which may include genetic endowments of ability, 
preschool human capital, or motivation.
        I also use residual income in this study as a proxy to determine the position of an 
individual in the skill distribution. Unexplained incomes used in this chapter are residuals 
from a regression of the logarithm of income on some observable individual variables. 
These variables are age, gender, education, and work experience. A general form of the 
wage regression is given below.
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                                     Ln(income)i,t  = γ0 + γ1 Yi  + γ2 Zi,t  + εi,t                                                     (27)
         where the vector Yi  represents a set of time-invariant individual characteristics, and 
the vector Zi,t represents a set of time-varying individual characteristics of person-i in 
year-t. Since regression of wage on education is biased [Garen (1984) and Weiss (1995)], 
I used Heckman two-step correction to obtain unbiased parameters. Marital status and the 
number of children at home are used in the selection equation in addition to the other 
variables. Table 10 presents wage regression and the first stage estimates. The first stage 
estimates show that being married and having more education are positively correlated. 
More  educated  people  tend  to  have  fewer  children.  Results  of  the  wage  regression 
indicate  that  more  education  raises  earnings,  more  work  experience  induces  higher 
incomes,  and  males earn more than females.  These are all  familiar  and unsurprising 
results. The lambda term is significant and negatively signed. This means that the error 
terms in the selection and primary equations are negatively correlated. Thus, unobserved 
factors that make participation more likely tend to be associated with lower wages. 
          Since roles of human capital and physical capital in the firm formation decisions 
are analyzed, there are both wage-earners and self-employed individuals in my sample. 
Summary statistics of residual income for wage-earners and self-employed individuals 
are given in Table 11. 
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                                       Table 10 : Results of Labor Income Regression
Constant      8.6142***(0.1094)
Age      0.0139***(0.0009)
Gender      0.4208***(0.0172)
Education      0.0658***(0.0032)
Work Experience      0.0072***(0.0011)
Lambda  - 1.4123***(0.3168)
R2 0.2819
First Stage Estimates
Age   0.0211
(0.1031)
Gender     0.4309**
(0.1465)
Married   0.1675*
(0.0146)
Number of Children - 0.5901**
(0.0412)
Work Experience - 0.0184
(0.1040)
R2 0.2991
Observations 13,886
                                Standard Errors are reported in parentheses. 
                                ***Significant at 1 %  level; **Significant at 5 %  level;  *Significant at 10 %  level  
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                                                Table 11: Summary Statistics of Unexplained Incomes
Wage-Earners Self-Employed
Mean 0.023 - 0.089
Std. Dev. 0.725 1.273
25th 
Percentile - 0.913 - 1.351
60th 
Percentile - 0.006 - 0.009
90th 
Percentile 0.453 0.489
100th 
Percentile 1.045 1.334
Observations 12,407 1,479
         Table 11 and Figure 8 show that mean residual income for self-employed people is  
smaller than that  for wage-earners.  However,  the variance of unexplained income for 
self-employed  people  is  larger.  Unexplained  income  of  self-employed  individuals  is 
lower than that  of wage-earners  at  the first  60th percentile  and higher  above the 90th 
percentile.         
         Since occupational  decisions  of  people having distinct  positions  in  the skill  
distribution are not the same,  they are divided into four ability groups in  the model. 
Consistent with the model, I also use four ability groups to classify individuals in my 
sample  according  to  their  positions  in  the  skill  distribution.  People  at  the  first  25th 
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percentile of the skill distribution are in G1. Since they are at the lowest end, they are 
called  low-ability  people  in  this  chapter.  Individuals  at  the  highest  end  of  the  skill 
distribution are classified as high-ability people. They constitute the top 10 % of the skill 
distribution. People in between these two ends are also divided into two additional groups 
as G2 and G3. Group G2 contains the next thirty five percent of the skill distribution after 
G1. People in G3 constitute the thirty percent of the skill distribution below those in G4. 
      Figure-8: Unexplained Income Distributions for Paid-Employees and Self-Employed
        Incomes of wage-earners and self-employed people are not the same. Summary 
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statistics of annual total labor income for wage-earners and self-employed individuals are 
given in  Table 12.  Table 12 and Figure 9 show that mean incomes of self-employed 
people are greater than those of wage-earners. The same is also true for the variances. 
That  is,  variances  of  incomes for  self-employed individuals  are  larger  than those for 
wage-earners. Incomes of self-employed individuals are lower than those of wage-earners 
at  the  first  25th percentile  and  higher  at  the  60th percentile.  That  is,  lower-ability 
individuals are,  on average,  earning more by being wage-earners than becoming self-
employed. Higher-ability individuals, on the other hand, are earning more by becoming 
self-employed than staying as wage-earners. 
                Table 12: Mean Annual Total Labor Income for Two Employment Groups 
                              (Paid-Workers and Self-Employed Individuals).
Wage-Earners Self-Employed
Mean 41,248 52,614
Std. Dev. 44,581 148,564
25th Percentile (G1) 16,423 15,283
60th Percentile  (G2) 36,109 39,024
90th Percentile  (G3) 51,735 60,683
100th Percentile (G4) 64,289 76,639
Observations 12,407 1,479
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          Figure-9:  Earning Distributions for Wage-Earners and Self-Employed People
     
         Consistent with theoretical model, I divided industry data into two categories which 
are capital-intensive industry and ability-intensive industry14 according to the amount of 
capital needed to enter. That is, major costs of a capital-intensive industry includes costs 
coming from investments  in  equipment,  machinery,  or  other  expensive  capital  goods 
Kleindorfer  and  Wu  (2003).  Mining,  utilities,  railroads,  construction,  and  heavy 
manufacturing  are  capital-intensive  industries.  Financial  services  and  software 
development,  however,  are  typically  non  capital-intensive  Schmidt  (2004).  Capital-
intensity is also defined as the asset-intensity Datta and Rajagopalan (1998).  In other 
words, founding a new firm in a capital-intensive industry requires a high investment in 
14 Appendix-IV shows the lists of Capital-Intensive and Ability-Intensive Industries in PSID
75
0
5.
00
0e
-0
6.
00
00
1
.0
00
01
5
.0
00
02
D
e
ns
ity
0 50000 100000 150000 200000
Annual Total Labor Income
self-employed
wage-earner
fixed assets Ghemawat (1991); Harrigan (1981). Thus, amount of fixed assets required 
for production creates the distinction between a capital-intensive industry and an ability-
intensive industry.  A new firm needs more funds for its fixed asset investments if  its 
industry is capital-intensive, whereas it needs less money for its fixed asset investments if 
its industry is ability-intensive. Because the PSID does not include data for fixed asset  
investment costs or capital asset requirements of the industries, industry classification in 
this paper is done according to the definitions and classifications provided by the related 
literature as stated previously. Since abilities or skills of the individuals who found and 
operate the firms are within the human capital, estimated ability level of the individual is 
used as a proxy to reflect his human capital in this study. Entrepreneurial earnings of 
individuals differ along with the industry which is chosen for the new firm. 
        Summary statistics of entrepreneurial incomes according to industry preferences are 
given in Table 13. It shows that mean earning of entrepreneurs in an ability-intensive 
industry is  greater  than that  of   entrepreneurs  in  a capital-intensive industry.  That  is, 
founding  a  firm in  an  ability-based industry  brings,  on  average,  higher  income than 
founding a  firm in a  capital-intensive  industry.  For  the  variances,  it  is  observed that 
variances of incomes for self-employed individuals in an ability-intensive industry are 
greater than those for self-employed individuals in a capital-intensive industry.  
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                 Table 13: Mean Entrepreneurial Incomes of People in Ability-Intensive
                               and Capital-Intensive Industries.
Ability-Intensive 
Industry
Capital-Intensive 
Industry
Mean 64,319 52,025
Std. Dev. 175,007 163,426
G1 16,139 17,214
G2 44,201 37,319
G3 68,151 61,178
G4 95,740 73,950
Observations 586 893
       Entrepreneurial income from an ability-intensive industry is lower than that from a 
capital-intensive industry for firm-owners at the 25th percentile. Therefore, founding a 
firm in a capital-intensive industry brings more profit than founding the firm in an ability-
intensive industry for these low-ability individuals in G1. In contrast, firm-owners at the 
top 10th percentile earn more by having the firm in an ability-intensive industry than 
having it in a capital-intensive industry. In other words, high-ability entrepreneurs in G4 
are getting higher profits from having ability-based firms than having capital-based firms. 
For firm-owners in G2 and G3, mean earnings in a capital-intensive industry are less than 
those in an ability-intensive industry. 
         I used multinomial logit15 to analyze my panel data. Three main forms of my 
15 Multinomial Logit, used by Schmidt and Strauss (1975), is utilized in my empirical analysis in order 
to observe relative probabilities.
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regressions are  given in equations (24), (25), and (26) which are run for each ability 
group separately. In the specifications, P1  shows probability of choosing to stay in paid-
work, P2 shows probability of choosing to enter high-ability self-employment, and finally 
P3 shows probability of choosing to enter high-capital self-employment for individual-i. I 
used age, wealth, and personal ability level as independent variables in all regressions to 
test the predictions of my theoretical model. Dependent variable in equation (28) shows 
relative probabilities of choosing to enter high-ability self-employment and to stay in 
paid-work.
             Loge  (P2 / P1)i   =  α0 + α1 (Age)i  + α2 (Wealth)i  + α3 (Ability)i + εi                                (28)
Similarly, dependent variable in regression (29) shows relative probabilities of choosing 
to enter high-capital self-employment and to stay in paid-work.
                      Loge  (P3 / P1)i   =  μ0 + μ1 (Age)i  + μ2 (Wealth)i + μ3 (Ability)i  + ε i                         (29) 
Dependent variable of the last specification given below shows relative probabilities of 
choosing to enter high-capital self-employment and  high-ability self-employment.          
               Loge  (P3 / P2)i  =  δ0 + δ1 (Age)i  + δ2 (Wealth)i  + δ3 (Ability)i + εi                               (30)
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Empirical Results :
       Table-14 exhibits results obtained from the empirical analysis. Results from Part A 
indicate that  greater ability makes it more likely to enter high-ability self-employment 
than does wage work for G3 and G4 individuals. This result is as expected because the 
model implies that founding ability-based firms brings more monetary return than doing 
wage work for the ones in G3 and G4. Moreover, Part B shows that more ability makes it 
more likely to enter high-capital self-employment than to do wage work for people in G2, 
G3, and G4. These results are statistically significant only for those in G3 and G4. Since 
establishing  capital-based  firms  is  more  profitable  than  working  as  wage-earners  for 
them, this implication is also consistent with the model. It can be seen from Part C that 
more ability makes it  more likely to  enter  high-ability self-employment than to  enter 
high-capital self-employment for those in G3 and G4 even though these results are not 
significant. Thus, we can conclude that more ability makes it the most likely outcome to 
enter  high-ability  self-employment  for  high-ability  people  in  G4.  The  conclusion  is 
consistent with Prediction-3 which states that high-ability people are more likely to enter 
ability-intensive industry.
      On the other hand, Part A implies that more ability makes it less likely to enter high-
ability self-employment than to do wage work for individuals in G1 and G2. In addition, 
Part B shows that more ability makes it less likely to enter high-capital self-employment 
than to do wage work for people in G1. That is, outcomes for low-ability people indicate 
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that working as wage-earners becomes more likely outcome than founding own firms 
when personal ability level increases. Thus, this is not consistent with the model. Results 
presented in Part C show that more ability makes it less likely to enter high-capital self-
employment than to enter high-ability self-employment for individuals in G1. And more 
ability makes it  more likely to enter high-capital  self-employment than to enter high-
ability self-employment for individuals in G2. But, these results are not significant. Since 
the last prediction of the model shown by Prediction-4 indicates that low-ability people 
are  more  likely  to  do  wage-work,  these  empirical  results  for  individuals  in  G1  are 
inconsistent with it. If we look at the empirical results related with wealth in Part A, we 
observe that more wealth makes it more likely to enter high-ability self-employment than 
to do wage work for all individuals in four ability groups. 
          Similarly, Part B shows that more wealth makes it more likely to enter high-capital 
self-employment than to do wage work for all people but especially for the ones in G2, 
G3, and G4. These results are as expected according to the model because both capital-
intensive  and  ability-intensive  industries  require  wealth  for  firm  formation  although 
amount of wealth necessary for an ability-based firm is less than that necessary for a 
capital-based firm. Outcomes in Part C imply that more wealth makes it less likely to 
enter  high-capital  self-employment  than  to  enter  high-ability  self-employment  for 
individuals in G1, G2, and G3. Greater wealth makes it more likely to enter high-capital 
self-employment than to enter high-ability self-employment for people in G4.
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                   Table 14:   Relative Probabilities of Three Occupational Choices
G1 G2 G3 G4
A. Dependent Variable: Loge  (P2 / P1)
Constant    - 4.6162***
(0.2454)
   - 5.0979***
(0.3685)
    - 5.1964***
(0.5410)
   - 5.4541***
(0.6403)
Age      0.0286***
(0.0049)
      0.0307***
(0.0081)
0.0102
(0.0098)
0.0212*
(0.0118)
Wealth    2.97e-07**
(1.21e-07) 
      8.08e-07***
(1.51e-07)
     7.63e-07***
(1.38e-07)
     4.56e-07***
(1.40e-07)
Ability    - 0.5141***
(0.0709)
- 0.7935
(0.6314)
    1.7852**
(0.7131)
      1.5622***
(0.2873)
B. Dependent Variable: Loge  (P3 / P1)
Constant     - 3.9957***
(0.2489)
    - 3.5851***
(0.3610)
    - 3.3427***
(0.4896)
   - 2.2499***
(0.5878)
Age   0.0098*
(0.0053)
- 0.0084
(0.0090)
   - 0.0259***
(0.0097)
   - 0.0435***
(0.0124)
Wealth 1.46e-08
(2.46e-07)
    5.32e-07**
(2.36e-07)
  3.98e-07*
(2.32e-07)
     4.74e-07***
(1.43e-07)
Ability    - 0.5894***
(0.0719)
0.1633
(0.6893)
1.3221*
(0.6835)
1.0488***
(0.3543)
C. Dependent Variable: Loge  (P3 / P2)
Constant   0.6196*
(0.3289)
      1.5279***
(0.5067)
    1.8426**
(0.7200)
     3.1939***
(0.7852)
Age    - 0.0186***
(0.0067)
   - 0.0389***
(0.0118)
   - 0.0360***
(0.0136)
   - 0.0654***
(0.0164)
Wealth - 2.84e-07
(2.52e-07)
- 2.77e-07
(2.31e-07)
- 3.65e-07
(2.37e-07)
1.79e-08
(5.39e-08)
Ability - 0.0753
(0.0822)
0.9578
(0.9307)
- 0.4633
(0.9739)
- 0.5084
(0.3620)
Pseudo R2 0.06 0.03 0.0298 0.08
Observations 3,809 4,903 3,759 1,414
     Standard Errors are reported in parentheses
     ***Significant at 1 %  level; **Significant at 5 %  level;  *Significant at 10 %  level  
81
However, results in Part C are statistically insignificant. Consequently, it can be said that 
these  empirical  results  about  wealth  are  consistent  with  Prediction-1  which  says  that 
wealthy people are more likely to enter into self-employment by founding firms in both 
capital-intensive  and  ability-intensive  industries.  That  is,  both  industry  types  require 
wealth.      
        In order to test Prediction-2, I use age as an independent variable in the regressions. 
Associated  results  in  Part  A show  that  it  is  more  likely  to  enter  high-ability  self-
employment than to do wage work for all individuals in four ability groups when they get 
older. The results are statistically significant for the ones in G1, G2, and G4. Moreover, 
Part B indicates that it is more likely to enter high-capital self-employment than to do 
wage work for individuals in G1 when they get older. These empirical results support 
Prediction-2 that entries into both industry types, capital-intensive and ability-intensive, 
will often happen later in life. Because, liquidity constrained young individuals can found 
firms  in  both  industry types  when they get  older  by using  their  savings.  The model 
implies that saving money to accumulate wealth necessary for the new firms takes time. 
However, empirical results shown in Part B also point out that it is less likely to enter  
high-capital self-employment than to do wage work for individuals in G2, G3, and G4 
when they get older. Since these results are statistically significant only for the ones in G3 
and  G4,  it  can  be  said  that  empirical  results  for  G3 and  G4 people  contradict  with 
Prediction-2. 
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Conclusion
 
       This chapter explores the role of organizational capital, human capital and physical 
capital, in the firm formation  activities of people at different skill levels by constructing 
a theoretical model and analyzing its testable implications empirically. Existing industries 
are categorized as a capital-intensive industry or an ability-intensive industry so that they 
can  be  distinguished  according  to  main  organizational  capital  required. A capital-
intensive industry requires more physical capital consequently more funds for investment 
whereas, an ability-intensive industry requires more human capital. Human capital refers 
to  personal  ability level in this  chapter.  Individuals are also divided into four groups 
according their personal ability levels in order to observe occupational differences among 
them. 
        It is shown that occupational choices and firm formation actions of people in distinct 
ability groups differ. That is, more ability makes the most able individuals at the top 10 % 
of  the  skill  distribution  more  likely  to  set  up  firms  in  an  ability-intensive  industry 
because, they earn the greatest  income from it.  The required high-ability level for an 
ability-intensive industry does not constitute a barrier for them, instead it stimulates these 
individuals' ability-based firm formation activities. On the other hand, the model implies 
that low-ability people at the lowest 25 % of the skill distribution earn the least income if 
they establish ability-based firms because of their limited personal ability levels. In other 
words, their low personal ability levels constitute an entry barrier to an ability-intensive 
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industry. Since being wage-earners brings the greatest  monetary return for these low-
ability  individuals,  they  become  paid-employees.  However,  this  implication  for  low-
ability individuals is not supported empirically. Results indicate that they are more likely 
to  work  as  wage-earners  than  to  found  their  own  firms  when  personal  ability  level 
increases.
       The model indicates that firm formation actions of other individuals in between low-
ability and high-ability people also depend on their initial wealth, savings, and personal 
ability  levels.  The  ones  in  G2  choose  to  found  firms  in  a  capital-intensive  industry 
because it brings the greatest monetary return for them. However, this can be achieved if 
they have enough initial wealth for the investment. Thus, wealthier G2 people become 
capital-based firm-owners when young and continue operating the same firms when old. 
Liquidity constrained G2 people, on the other hand, become wage-earners when young 
and establish their own capital-based firms when old by using their accumulated savings. 
If their savings are not high enough, they continue to work as paid-employees in the 
second  period.  This  means  that  required  high  funds  for  a  capital-intensive  industry 
constitute an entry barrier for them. And having an ability-based firm does not bring the 
greatest return for them due to the lack of necessary high human capital. The last group of 
people in G3 also have the greatest earning from establishing a capital-based firm. But, 
some  of  them choose  to  set  up  ability-based  firms  which  bring  the  second  greatest 
earning due to not having high amount of wealth. Since place of these people in G3 is 
between 60 % and 90 % of the skill distribution, they have relatively higher personal 
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ability levels. Thus, required high human capital is not a big barrier for them. Remaining 
G3 individuals become paid-employees in the first period, then they establish their own 
firms in the second period of their life. Their second-period firms can be capital-based or 
ability-based depending on the amount of savings. In other words, G3 people with high 
accumulated  wealth  set  up  their  own  capital-based  firms  whereas,  others  with  less 
accumulated wealth found their ability-based firms. If their accumulated wealth is lower 
than the amount of funds necessary for an ability-based firm, they continue to be wage-
earners in the second period. 
        Additional two predictions of the model are also tested against data to observe the 
implications of theoretical cases. Prediction-1 is supported by the empirical results. That 
is, since both industry types require wealth even though the amount of funds necessary 
for them are different, wealthy people are more likely to found both capital-based and 
ability-based firms.  On the  other  hand,  Prediction-2 is  partly supported  by empirical 
results. Namely, it is empirically proofed that entries into an ability-intensive industry 
often  happen later  in  life.  This  results  is  true  especially for  the ones  in  G1 and G2. 
Moreover, entries into a capital-intensive industry also happen later in life for individuals 
in G1. However, entries into a capital-intensive industry do not happen later in life for 
people  in  G3  and  G4.  And  this  last  result  for  G3  and  G4  people  contradicts  with 
Prediction-2.
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IV. CHAPTER 3 : WHO EARNS MORE? FUTURE ENTREPRENEURS OR
                                THEIR NON-ENTREPRENEURIAL COLLEAGUES
Introduction
       This chapter investigates earning differentials between future entrepreneurs and their 
non-entrepreneurial colleagues by considering the chosen industries of the new firms. 
        Earning differentials in self-employment and paid-employment were investigated by 
Hamilton (2000).  He found that the median hourly wages of future entrepreneurs are 
higher than the wages of employees remaining on the job, and as a result he concluded 
that there must be significant nonpecuniary benefits to owning a business. However, this 
result  may  change  if  industry  preferences  of  future  entrepreneurs  are  taken  into 
consideration. Thus, I explore the determinants of self-employment by studying incomes 
of employees remaining on the job, future entrepreneurs whose preference is a capital-
intensive  industry,  and  future  entrepreneurs  whose  preference  is  an  ability-intensive 
industry.  A  capital-intensive  industry  refers  to  an  industry  requiring  substantial 
investment in capital assets, and consequently requiring more liquidity for the production 
of  goods.  An  ability-intensive  industry  is  an  industry  requiring  more  human  capital 
instead of monetary capital for the production of goods. I hypothesize that individuals 
that  form new  firms  in  an  ability-intensive  industry  were  earning  more  than  others 
remaining in wage-work. Since an ability-intensive industry requires a relatively high 
skill level, they are more likely to have higher abilities. On the other hand, people who 
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found  new  firms  in  a  capital-intensive  industry  were  earning  less  than  employees 
remaining on the job. 
        Observations on a sample of individuals in the PSID are used in this chapter. A panel 
is  constructed  for  the  period  2003-2007.  This  time period  is  selected  for  the  sample 
because  it  includes  all  information  needed  for  the  analysis.  Since entrepreneurial 
behaviors of people having distinct ability levels are not the same [Elfenbeim, Hamilton, 
and Zenger, (2008)], individuals are divided into four groups according to their personal 
skills.
        In order to measure personal skill level, I construct an indicator for innate ability 
from the residuals obtained in a regression of labor earnings on age, gender, education, 
and work experience (cf. Behrman and Rosenzweig, 1999). Education is not taken as a 
part of ability because two people having the same education level can earn different 
incomes  even  though  they  both  do  identical  jobs,  because  of  their  distinct  personal 
abilities. Individuals are placed in four ability groups, denoted by G1 through G4, with 
G1 representing the lowest ability group. These are not quantiles. Group G1 accounts for 
the first 25 percent of the observations, G2 accounts for the next thirty five percent, G3 
accounts for the next thirty percent, and G4 represents the top ten percent.
        The empirical results agree with prior research. That is, high-ability individuals that 
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form new firms in an ability-intensive industry were earning more than others remaining 
in paid-work. Since a high-ability industry requires more skills but less capital, this result 
for G3 and G4 people supports my hypothesis. Moreover, estimates indicate that low-
ability  people  that  found firms  in  a  capital-intensive  industry were  earning less  than 
others  remaining in  wage-work.  This  is  also  consistent  with  my expectation  because 
industry preferences of G1 and G2 individuals for new firms are capital-intensive. Since a 
high-capital industry requires more capital but less skill, this result for low-ability people 
also supports my hypothesis. 
        This chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the data and empirical 
methods, section 3 provides the empirical results, and the last section concludes.
Data and Empirical Methods  
       In order to analyze earning differentials between future entrepreneurs and their non-
entrepreneurial colleagues, I use two-year panel data constructed from the Panel Study of 
Income Dynamics (PSID).  My data contain 13,860 individuals in years 2003-2007. I 
choose this time period for data because it has all information that I need for this study. I 
use household heads in my sample because they are family members about whom the 
greatest amount of information is available. 
       Since personal ability level is the key element that creates earning differentials 
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among people having similar human capital, I have to measure personal ability level and 
distinguish individuals in my sample accordingly. Total labor income of people depends 
on individual  characteristics like age, gender, education, work experience, and personal 
ability.  We can measure  age,  gender,  education,  and work  experience  but  we cannot 
measure personal ability level directly. There are two ways of measuring ability used in 
literature. The first, which is used by Elfenbeim, Hamilton, and Zenger (2008) holds the 
education  level  constant.  They  construct  a  percentile  rank  in  the  skill  distribution 
separately for people having the same highest degree. They measure relative ability as the 
position  of  a  given  individual  within  the  pay  distribution  in  a  given  year  among 
individuals with the same highest degree. This method seems logical because we observe 
large  income  differences  among  people  having  identical  observable  human  capital. 
However,  this  method  ignores  the  impacts  of  work  experience,  age,  and  gender  on 
personal labor income. These additional characteristics can also create large differences 
in labor income. For instance, the one with more work experience and/or older can earn 
more than others although all have identical highest degrees. Thus, the effects of personal 
characteristics like age, gender, and work experience should also be controlled so that 
innate personal ability which creates the difference can be measured.
         The second way of measuring personal ability is to use residual income as a proxy 
Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1993). This is a more logical way of measuring skill level. It 
controls for the effects of age, gender, and education on personal labor income and uses 
the residual as a measure of ability. As Behrman and Rosenzweig (1999) indicate, ability 
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has been used as the rubric for all unmeasured earnings endowments, which may include 
genetic endowments of ability, preschool human capital, or motivation.
         I also use residual income in this study as a proxy to determine the position of an  
individual in the skill distribution. Unexplained incomes used in this chapter are residuals 
from a regression of the logarithm of income on some observable individual variables. 
These variables are age, gender, work experience, and education.  A general form of the 
wage regression is given below.
                Ln(income)i,t  = γ0 + γ1 Yi  + γ2 Zi,t  + εi,t                                                       (31)
where the vector Yi   represents a set of time-invariant individual characteristics, and the 
vector Zi,t represents a set of time-varying individual characteristics of person-i in year-t. 
As indicated by Garen (1984) and Weiss  (1995), regression of  wage on education is 
biased. Thus, I used Heckman two-step correction to obtain unbiased parameters in my 
labor income regression. Marital status and number of children at home are used in the 
selection equation in addition to other variables. OLS estimates of wage regression and 
the first-stage results are presented in Table 15. The first stage estimates show that being 
married and having more education are positively correlated. And more educated people 
have  fewer  children.  This  result  is  consistent  with  the  indications  of  Kenny,  Lee, 
Maddala, and Trost (1979). That is, married people specialize in the labor market more 
than singles, and accordingly have a greater intensive to invest in human capital. 
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                                  Table 15:   Labor Income Regression Estimates
                      
Constant       8.7121***(0.1106)
Age      0.0150***(0.0011)
Gender       0.4325***(0.0176)
Education      0.3703***(0.0052)
Work Experience      0.0094***(0.0014)
Lambda      - 1.4369***(0.3289)
R2 0.3893
First Stage Estimates
Age 0.0211(0.1031)
Gender    0.4309**(0.1465)
Married  0.1676*(0.0162)
Number of Children - 0.5901**(0.0405)
Work Experience - 0.0183(0.1042)
R2 0.2984
Observations 14,860
                          Standard Errors are reported in parentheses. ***Significant at 1 %  level; 
                          **Significant at 5 %  level; *Significant at 10 %  level  
  
          Familiar results of the wage regression indicate that having more education raises 
earnings,  more  work experience induces  higher  incomes,  and  males  earn more than 
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females. The lambda term is significant and negatively signed. This means that the error 
terms in the selection and primary equations are negatively correlated. Thus, unobserved 
factors that make participation more likely tend to be associated with lower wages. 
       Since  earning  differentials  between  future  entrepreneurs  and  their  non-
entrepreneurial colleagues are analyzed, there are both wage-earners and self-employed 
people in my sample.  Summary statistics of residual income for wage-earners and self-
employed individuals are given in Table 16.  Table 16 and Figure 10 show that mean 
residual income for self-employed people is smaller than that for wage-earners. However, 
the  variance  of  unexplained  income  for  self-employed  people  is  larger.  Unexplained 
incomes of self-employed individuals are lower than those of wage-earners at the 25 th 
percentile and higher above the 90th percentile.
                                             Table 16: Unexplained Income Statistics
Wage-Earners Self-Employed
Mean 0.011 - 0.089
Std. Dev. 0.713 1.272
25th Percentile - 0.914 - 1.350
60th Percentile - 0.007 - 0.009
90th Percentile 0.455 0.469
100th Percentile 1.041 1.315
Observations 12,392 1,468
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          As Elfenbeim, Hamilton, and Zenger (2008) show entrepreneurial behaviors of 
individuals having distinct places in the skill distribution are different. That is, low-ability 
and high-ability individuals are more likely to be self-employed. Moreover, two industry 
types, capital-intensive and ability-intensive, utilized in this chapter differs according to 
the main input required for the production. Namely, personal skill level is the main input 
for an ability-intensive industry, whereas a large amount of capital investment is the main 
input for a capital-intensive industry.  Thus, individual skill  level is expected to be an 
important criteria in the industry selection of a potential entrepreneur in this study. Since 
my aim is  to  analyze  previous  earnings  and  subsequent  self-employment  choices  of 
people having different  skill  levels  by considering their  industry choices  for  the new 
firms,  individuals  are  divided  into  four  groups  according  to  their  personal abilities. 
People at the first 25th percentile of the skill distribution are in G1. Since they are at the 
lowest end, they are called low-ability people in this chapter. Individuals at the highest 
end of the skill distribution are classified as high-ability people. They constitute the top 
10 % of the skill distribution. People in between these two ends are also divided into two 
additional groups as G2 and G3. Group G2 contains the next thirty five percent of the 
skill  distribution  after  G1.  People  in  G3  constitute  the  thirty  percent  of  the  skill 
distribution below those in G4. Incomes of wage-earners and self-employed people are 
not the same. Summary statistics of annual total labor income for wage-earners and self-
employed individuals are given in Table 17.
93
                    Figure-10: Unexplained Income Distributions (Wage-Earners and 
                                       Self-employed Individuals)
                    Table 17: Mean Annual Total Labor Income for Wage-Earners and 
                                  Self-Employed People 
Wage-Earners Self-Employed
Mean 41,252 52,539
Std. Dev. 43,581 148,266
25th Percentile (G1) 16,316 15,176
60th Percentile  (G2) 36,009 39,025
90th Percentile  (G3) 51,741 60,670
100th Percentile (G4) 64,279 76,538
Observations 12,392 1,468
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                Figure-11:  Income Distributions for Paid-Workers and Entrepreneurs 
         Table 17 and Figure 11 show that mean and variance of income for self-employed 
people are  greater  than those for  wage-earners.  Incomes of self-employed people are 
lower  than  those  of  wage-earners  at  the  first  25th percentile  and  higher  at  the  60th 
percentile.  That  is,  lower-ability  individuals,  on  average,  are  earning  more  by  being 
wage-earners than becoming self-employed. Higher-ability people, on the other hand, are 
earning more by becoming self-employed than staying as wage-earners. 
       Since two industry types, capital-intensive and ability-intensive, are utilized as the 
industry choices of future entrepreneurs, industry classification done in previous chapter 
is also used in this chapter.   Similar to the second chapter, estimated ability level of an 
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individual is used as a proxy to reflect his human capital in this chapter. Earnings of firm-
owners differ according to the industry chosen for the new firms. Summary statistics of 
entrepreneurial incomes according to the industry types are given in Table 18.
                Table 18: Summary of Entrepreneurial Incomes in Ability-Intensive and 
                              Capital-Intensive Industries
Ability-Intensive 
Industry
Capital-Intensive 
Industry
Mean 64,319 52,011
Std. Dev. 175,007 163,430
G1 16,139 17,209
G2 44,201 37,099
G3 68,151 61,138
G4 95,740 73,941
Observations 585 883
         Table 18 shows that mean earnings of entrepreneurs in an ability-intensive industry 
is  greater  than  that  of   entrepreneurs  in  a  capital-intensive  industry.  This  means  that 
founding  a  firm in  an  ability-based industry  brings,  on  average,  higher  income than 
founding a  firm in a  capital-intensive  industry.  For  the  variances,  it  is  observed that 
variance  of  incomes  for  self-employed  individuals  in  an  ability-intensive  industry  is 
greater than that for self-employed people in a capital-intensive industry.  
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       Entrepreneurial income from an ability-intensive industry is lower than that from a 
capital-intensive industry for firm-owners at the 25th percentile. Therefore, founding a 
firm in a capital-intensive industry yields, on average, more earnings than founding the 
firm in an ability-intensive industry for these low-ability people in G1. In contrast, firm-
owners at the 10th percentile earn more by having the firm in an ability-intensive industry 
than having it in a capital-intensive industry. In other words, high-ability entrepreneurs in 
G4 are getting higher profits from having an ability-based firm than having a capital-
based firm. For firm-owners in G2 and G3, mean earning in a capital-intensive industry is 
less than that in an ability-intensive industry. 
       Tables 19 and 20 show employment patterns in my data. Table 19 shows that 10.6 % 
of  paid-employees  became  self-employed  while,  89.4  %  of  them  stayed  as  paid-
employees. 
   Table 19:  Employment Patterns: Number and Fraction of Workers by Mobility Group
Self-Employed in 
year t+2 
Paid-Employee in 
year t+2
Total
Paid-Employee in year t
(Number & Fraction)
1,468
0.106
12,392
0.894
13,860
1.00
       Table 20 shows that 18.1 % of self-employed people whose choices are ability-
intensive industries are in G1 whereas, 24.8 % of them are in G4. Ability groups G2 and 
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G3 contain 23.1 % and 34 % of ability-based firm-owners, respectively. Similarly, 28.5 % 
of people who are self-employed in a capital-intensive industry are in G1 while, 10.3 % 
of them are in G4. Moreover, 36.6 % and 24.6 % of capital-based firm-owners are in G2 
and G3, respectively.
    Table 20: Employment Patterns: Number and Fraction of Workers by Industry Types
Self-employed in year t+2 Total
G1 G2 G3 G4
A. Ability-Intensive Industry 
Paid-Employee in year t
(Number & Fraction)
106
0.181
135
0.231
199
0.340
145
0.248
585
1.00
B. Capital-Intensive Industry 
Paid-Employee in year t
(Number & Fraction)
252
0.285
323
0.366
217
0.246
91
0.103
883
1.00
        I use year-pairs in my regressions because my aim is to explore earning differences 
between  people  who  become  self-employed  and  their  colleagues  who  stay as  wage-
earners two years later. The regression used for this purpose is given in equation (32). 
Since there are two industries that can be chosen for the new firms, this regression is run 
separately for each industry type. 
                                         LIi,t   = μ0 +μ1 Yi + μ2Zi,t  + μ3SEi,t+2  + εi,t                                                     (32)
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where LIi,t   is employee labor income and SEi,t+2  is a dummy variable that equals one if 
individual-i enters self-employment in year t+2. The terms Yi and Zi,t are two vectors used 
in all equations to test the impacts of individual characteristics. The vector Yi  represents a 
set of time-invariant individual characteristics and the vector Zi,t represents a set of time-
variant individual characteristics of person-i in year-t. Specifications (32) is run for each 
ability group separately. 
Empirical Results
       Tables 22 and 23 present resulting estimates of the regressions used to investigate 
earning differences between people who become self-employed and their colleagues who 
stay as wage-earners two years later. Since entry into self-employment two years later is 
endogenous, family size is used as an IV variable. In order to justify the usage of family 
size as an IV variable, firstly, its correlation with the disturbances in regression (32) is 
tested. This testing is done by re-estimating regression (32) with family size being added 
as an explanatory variable for each industry type. Estimated coefficients16 on family size, 
presented in Table 21, are not significantly different from zero. That is, family size is not 
an omitted variable. This result supports the validity of family size as an IV variable. 
Secondly,  relevance of family size as an IV variable is investigated by the first stage 
regressions presented in Part-B sections of Tables 22 and 23 for each industry type. 
16 Estimates for the other explanatory variables are as expected. That is, more work experience increases 
income. Individuals earn more when they get older. And males earn more than females. [ Borjas and 
Bronars (1989), Jovanovic and Moffitt (1990)]
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                          Table 21:   Validity of  IV Variable (Testing for Omitted Variables)
G1 G2 G3 G4
A. Dependent Variable: Employee Labor Income (Wage)
Constant       8.5697***(0.0750)
      9.5305***
(0.0279)
      9.8641***
(0.0314)
     9.5850***
(0.0812)
Family Size 0.0107(0.0237)
- 0.0184
(0.0349)
- 0.0219
(0.0452)
0.0184
(0.0231)
Age       0.0089***(0.0016)
      0.0172***
(0.0008)
      0.0207***
(0.0007)
     0.0293***
(0.0018)
Gender       0.6983***(0.0339)
     0.4965***
(0.0123)
      0.4237***
(0.0130)
     0.5937***
(0.0335)
Work Experience       0.0086***(0.0021)
     0.0148***
(0.0009)
     0.0175***
(0.0008)
     0.0179***
(0.0021)
Self-Employment 
Dummy for an Ability-
Intensive Industry
0.2102
(0.3706)
0.1762
(0.2363)
0.2893***
(0.0419)
0.5726***
(0.0721)
R2 0.3205 0.2070 0.2404 0.2612
Observations 3,079 4,613 4,082 1,205
B. Dependent Variable: Employee Labor Income (Wage)
Constant       8.6071***(0.0731)
     9.5313***
(0.0278)
      9.8719***
(0.0313)
     9.5836***
(0.0815)
Family Size 0.0130(0.0236)
 - 0.0185
(0.0649)
- 0.0213
(0.0751)
0.0194
(0.0431)
Age     0.0085***(0.0016)
     0.0172***
(0.0006)
      0.0206***
(0.0007)
     0.0298***
(0.0018)
Gender       0.6857***(0.0332)
     0.4991***
(0.0130)
     0.4312***
(0.0129)
    0.6048***
(0.0341)
Work Experience       0.0079***(0.0024)
      0.0148***
(0.0008)
     0.0172***
(0.0019)
     0.0179***
(0.0020)
Self-Employment 
Dummy for a Capital-
Intensive Industry 
   - 0.8618***
(0.0746)
   - 0.3604***
(0.0394)
 - 0.2857
(0.3411)
 - 0.1941
(0.3802)
R2 0.2906 0.3710 0.2729 0.2802
Observations 3,225 4,801 4,100 1,151
   Standard Errors are reported in parentheses. ***Significant at 1 %  level; **Significant at 5 %  level;  *Significant at 10 %  level  
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       Corresponding results  on  family size  are  positive  and statistically  significant. 
Namely, individuals having larger families are more likely to be self-employed in both 
ability-intensive and capital-intensive industries. Thus, family size is a valid and relevant 
IV variable. 
      Estimates about personal characteristics shown in Tables 22 and 23 imply that people 
earn  more  when  they  get  older.  Males  earn  more  than  females.  And  more  work 
experience increases income. Results in part-A of Table 22 indicate that individuals that 
form new firms in an ability-intensive industry were earning more than others remaining 
on the job. The implication is valid for people in four ability groups, but estimates are 
statistically significant only for those in G3 and G4. Since individuals in G3 and G4 
constitute the top 40 % of the skill distribution, they are high-ability people. These results 
indicate that high-ability people who become self-employed were earning more than their 
non-entrepreneurial colleagues. Their industry preferences for new firms are high-ability 
industries. Since a high-ability industry requires more skills but less capital, this result for 
high-ability people is reasonable.
 
         Estimates in Part-A of Table 23 imply that people that form new firms in a capital-
intensive industry were earning less than others remaining in wage-work. This is true for 
all individuals in four ability groups.  However, the results are statistically significant 
only for those in G1 and G2. Since individuals in G1 and G2 are at the lowest tail of the 
skill distribution, they are low-ability people.  These estimates indicate that low-ability 
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      Table 22:   Estimated Mobility Coefficients for Transitions from Paid-Work to 
                         Self-Employment in an Ability-Intensive Industry
G1 G2 G3 G4
A. Dependent Variable: Employee Labor Income (Wage)
Constant 6.1654(15.0057)
    10.2690***
(0.0431)
    10.3470***
(0.5496)
    11.5464***
(0.7728)
Age       0.0174***(0.0096)
    0.0105**
(0.0029)
      0.0169***
(0.0022)
    0.0182***
(0.0075)
Gender      0.5726***(0.0239)
    0.3698**
(0.1105)
      0.4790***
(0.0392)
      0.3793***
(0.1065)
Work Experience  0.0056*(0.0018)
  0.0095***
(0.0042)
  0.0117***
(0.0023)
  0.0198**
(0.0059)
Self-Employment 
Dummy for an Ability-
Intensive Industry
4.1214
(6.8965)
5.6652
(1.8624)
3.8412**
(1.8544)
     1.7769***
(0.1579)
R2 0.2933 0.1025 0.3011 0.2621
Observations 3,079 4,613 4,082 1,205
B. The First Stage IV Regressions
Family Size       0.2061***(0.0306)
      0.1974***
(0.0268)
      0.4168***
(0.0375)
      0.5648***
(0.1195)
Age     0.0201***(0.0052)
    0.0269**
(0.0113)
- 0.0029
(0.0142)
0.0022
(0.0139)
Gender     0.3027**(0.1425)
    0.3509**
(0.1741)
       0.8135***
(0.2437)
   0.5109**
(0.2275)
Work Experience  - 0.0027(0.0120)
0.0123
(0.0195)
    0.1248**
(0.0107)
0.0213
(0.0179)
Pseudo R2 0.1405 0.0974 0.1429 0.0797
Observations 3,079 4,613 4,082 1,205
     Standard Errors are reported in parentheses.
     ***Significant at 1 %  level; **Significant at 5 %  level;  *Significant at 10 %  level  
people  who  become  self-employed  were  earning  less  than  their  non-entrepreneurial 
colleagues. Their industry preferences for new firms are high-capital industries. 
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      Table 23:   Estimated Mobility Coefficients for Transitions from Paid-Work to 
                        Self-Employment in a Capital-Intensive Industry
G1 G2 G3 G4
A. Dependent Variable: Employee Labor Income (Wage)
Constant       9.4957***(0.1461)
    11.3628***
(2.6203)
    10.8686***
(0.0353)
    11.6154***
(0.8180)
Age    0.0076**(0.0028)
      0.0242***
(0.0010)
      0.0189***
(0.0032)
    0.0264***
(0.0058)
Gender      0.7325**
(0.1838)
      0.4690***
(0.0165)
    0.4701**
(0.1092)
      0.3695**
*
(0.0368)
Work Experience  0.0146**(0.0025)
  0.0074**
(0.0046)
     0.0173***
(0.0029)
  0.0103**
(0.0064)
Self-Employment 
Dummy for a Capital-
Intensive Industry
    - 3.4079***
(0.5453)
    - 4.6318***
(1.7986)
- 5.2235
(1.5612)
- 1.0111
(1.5097)
R2 0.2933 0.1026 0.3012 0.2611
Observations 3,225 4,801 4,100 1,151
B. The First Stage IV Regressions
Family Size     0.6731**(0.0502)
      0.7195***
(0.0369)
    0.2786**
(0.0134)
     0.8439***
(0.1306)
Age     0.0156**(0.0081)
    0.0321***
(0.0098)
- 0.0007
(0.0123)
- 0.0012
(0.0154)
Gender 0.2104(0.2271)
0.1654
(0.2509)
5.0766
(7.1203)
0.1705
(0.3120)
Work Experience 0.0003(0.0089)
0.0089
(0.0110)
0.0215
(0.0179)
   0.2111**
(0.0169)
Pseudo R2 0.0672 0.0187 0.0492 0.1209
Observations 3,225 4,801 4,100 1,151
     Standard Errors are reported in parentheses.
     ***Significant at 1 %  level; **Significant at 5 %  level;  *Significant at 10 %  level  
Since a high-capital industry requires more capital but less skill, this result for low-ability 
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people is also reasonable.
Conclusion
 
       This chapter  analyzes earning differentials between future entrepreneurs and their 
non-entrepreneurial colleagues.  Future entrepreneurs are categorized according to their 
industry  choices,  capital-intensive  or  ability-intensive,  for  the  new  firms.  A capital-
intensive industry requires more physical capital investment, while an ability-intensive 
industry requires more personal skill. Implications of the empirical results support my 
hypotheses.  Namely,  high-ability  individuals  that  establish  new  firms  in  an  ability-
intensive industry were earning more than others  remaining in  wage-work. And low-
ability G1 and G2 people that found new firms in a high-capital industry were earning 
less than others remaining in paid-work. 
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APPENDICES
I. Writing M2 in terms of M1 and C1 for different ability groups :
For A1 < A < A2   and  k11   >   θ   : 
We know that M 2=Π1
21r θ−k1
2S  and S=M 1−C1
We can rewrite M2 as M 2=Π1
21r θ−k1
21r S
Plug S into M2,
   M 2=Π 1
21r θ−k1
21r M 1−C 1
  
  
Thus, M 2=Y 21r M 1−C1
For A  *  < A ,  A2 < A < A *     and  k  21   ≤   θ < k  11  : 
We know that M 2=Π2
21r θ−k2
1S  and S=M 1−C1
We can rewrite M2 as M 2=Π2
21r θ−k2
11r S
Plug S into M2,
   M 2=Π 2
21r θ−k2
11r M 1−C 1
  
  
Thus, M 2=Y 21r M 1−C1
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M 2=Π1
21r θ−k 1
2
Y 2
1r M 1−C1
M 2=Π 2
21r θ−k 2
1
Y 2
1r M 1−C1
For A < A1 : 
We know that M 2=W 1r θS  and S=M 1−C1
We can rewrite M2 as M 2=W 1r θ1r S
Plug S into M2,
   M 2=W 1r θ1r M 1−C1
 
  
  
Thus, M 2=M 11r M 1−C1
For A1 < A < A2  and  A2 < A < A *  and  k 11  ≤   θ  : 
We know that M 2=Π1
21r θ−k1
1S  and S=M 1−C1
We can rewrite M2 as M 2=Π1
21r θ−k1
11r S
Plug S into M2,
   M 2=Π1
21r θ−k1
11r M 1−C1
Then,
  
   
  
  
Thus,  M 2=Y 21r M 1−C1
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M 2=W1rθ
Y 2
1r M 1−C1
M 2=Π 1
21r θ−k 1
1
Y 2
1r M 1−C1
For A  *  < A   and  A2 < A < A *  and  k 21  >   θ :  
We know that M 2=Π2
21r θ−k2
2S  and S=M 1−C1
We can rewrite M2 as M 2=Π2
21r θ−k2
21r S
Plug S into M2,
   M 2=Π2
21r θ−k2
21r M 1−C 1
Then,
  
   
  
  
Thus,  M 2=Y 21r M 1−C1
As a result,  M 2=Y 21r M 1−C1 for all ability groups.
where
     
 
II. Solving Household's Problem :
We know from Appendix-I that M 2=Y 21r M 1−C1
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M 2=Π 2
21r θ−k 2
2
Y 2
1r M 1−C1
Y 2={
W1r θ if AA1
Π 1
21r θ−k 1
1 if A1AA2 , A2AA
* and k 1
1θ
Π 2
21r θ−k 2
1 if A2AA
* and A*A and k 2
1θk 1
1
Π 1
21r θ−k 1
2 if A1AA2 and k 1
1θ
Π 2
21r θ−k 2
2 if A2AA
* , A*A and k 2
1θ
}
Since M2 = C2 , we have M 2=Y 21r M 1−C1=C 2
Therefore, 
   L=ln C1β ln C 2λ [Y 21r M 1−C1−C2]  
First order conditions are,
    
                                            
      
Thus,  and   
then,  
We know that C2 = M2 
   
   
We know from Appendix-I that M 2=Y 21r M 1−C1
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∂L
∂C1
= 1
C 1
− λ1r =0
∂ L
∂C2
= β
C2
−λ=0
1
C 1
= λ1r   λ= 1
C11r 
λ= β
C 2
1
1r C1
= β
C2
 C2=β 1r C 1
M 2=β 1r C1
C1=
M 2
β 1r 
C1=
Y 21r M 1−C1
β 1r 
    β 1r C1=Y 21r M 1−C1
     β 1r C 11r C 1=Y 21r M 1  
   1β 1r C1=Y 21r M 1
     
Therefore, consumption in the first period is 
Saving is S=M 1−C1
   
  
  
Thus, saving is   
We know that  C2=β 1r C 1
Therefore, consumption in the second period is 
   
As a result, the first period consumption, saving, and the second period consumption are 
as the followings:   
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C 1= 11β 1r Y 2 11β M 1
 S=M 1− 11 β 1r  Y 2− 11 β M 1
S= β1β M 1 11β1r Y 2
C2= β 1r 1β M 1 β1 β Y 2
C1= 11β M 1 11β1r Y 2
     
     
where
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S= β1β M 1 11 β1r Y 2
C2= β 1r 1β M 1 β1β Y 2
M 1={
Wθ if AA1
П1
1θ−k1
1 if A1AA2 , A2AA
* and k1
1θ
П 2
1θ−k 2
1 if A2AA
* and A*A and k2
1θk1
1
Wθ if A1AA2 and k1
1θ
Wθ if A2AA
* , A*A and k 2
1θ
}
M 2={
W1r θS  if AA1 , A2AA
* , A*A , A1AA2 and k2
2θS
П 1
21r θ−k 1
1S  if A1AA2 and A2AA
*
П 2
21r θ−k 2
1S  if A2AA
* , A*A
П 1
21r θ−k 1
2S  if A1AA2 , A2AA
* and θSk 1
2
П 2
21r θ−k 2
2S  if A2AA
* , A*A and k 2
2θSk1
2 }
Y 2={
W1r θ if AA1
Π1
21r θ−k 1
1 if A1AA2 , A2AA
* and k 1
1θ
Π2
21r θ−k 2
1 if A2AA
* and A*A and k 2
1θk 1
1
Π1
21r θ−k 1
2 if A1AA2 and k 1
1θ
Π2
21r θ−k 2
2 if A2AA
* , A*A and k 2
1θ
}
      П 1
1= f 1
1=k 1
1Aγ1
1
      П 2
1= f 2
1=k 2
1Aγ 2
1
      П 1
2= f 1
2=k 1
2Aγ1
2
      П 2
2= f 2
2=k 2
2A γ 2
2
    
  
III. Lists of Capital-Intensive and Ability-Intensive Industries in PSID :
Capital-Intensive Industries are
– Mining
– Utilities
– Construction
– Manufacturing
– Wholesale Trade
– Transportation and Warehousing
– Accommodations and Food Services
  
Ability-Intensive Industries are
– Information
– Finance and Insurance
– Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services
116
– Management, Administrative and Support, and Waste Management Services
– Educational Services
– Health Care and Social Assistance
– Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation
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